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Using data collected at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility, this research
aimed to examine factors that affect the likelihood of re-offending by testing two models:
a specific deterrence model and a proposed comparable capital model. Specifically, this
research aimed to examine how economic, cultural, and social capital in the community,
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of individuals who go to prison will eventually be returned to
the community. Unfortunately for offenders, criminal justice officials, and members of
the community, the exit door of prison is constantly revolving. Even though states are
spending close to 52 billion dollars annually on corrections, about 4 in 10 offenders
return to prison within the first three years of release (Langan and Levin 2002; Beck and
Shipley 1989; Pew Center on the States 2011). If states could reduce their recidivism
rates by just ten percent, they could save an average of 635 million dollars annually (Pew
Center on the States 2011). This research aims to examine factors that may increase an
offender’s likelihood of re-offending upon release from prison. This, in turn, should
inform policies that address recidivism rates, as well as lower correctional expenditures.
For released offenders, the percentage of re-arrest is 67.8 in the first three years
and 76.6 percent in the first 5 years upon release (Durose et al. 2014). By re-offending,
released offenders are risking the chance of being incarcerated again. Given this, it is
important to discover if and how previous punishment experiences affect the likelihood
of re-offending. Deterrence and rational choice theories assume that potential offenders
will calculate the costs and benefits of offending before they decide whether or not to
commit a crime (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Cornish and Clarke 1987; Clarke and Felson
1993; Wright 2010). If prison is viewed as a severe punishment, it makes sense that
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juries request and judges hand down lengthier prison sentences in hopes of deterring
convicts from re-engaging in crime (specific deterrence), as well as potential offenders
from committing similar crimes (general deterrence). If potential offenders, as well as
previous offenders, believe that punishment will be certain and severe, and if the costs of
committing crime outweigh the perceived benefits, then the offender should refrain from
criminal activity (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Cornish and Clarke 1987; Clarke and Felson
1993; Beyleveld 1979; Blumenstein et al. 1978; Grasmick et al. 1980; Levitt 1996;
Paternoster 1987; Piliavin et al. 1986; Sampson and Cohen 1988; Wright 2010). If this
were true, crime rates would be significantly lower and there would be no need for this
discussion.
Even with severe sanctions, people still commit crimes. The certainty and
severity of punishment may have some effect on offending, but the costs and benefits
associated with offending may be best understood in terms of opportunities
(conceptualized as forms of capital) in two distinct realms: prison and the community.
Generally speaking, capital refers to assets that one can use to maximize his or her
potential. Volume and composition of capital determine a person’s opportunities and
place in the social structure. Offenders who acquire a high volume of capital in prison, as
compared to their volume and composition of capital in conventional society, may not
view prison as a severe sanction. The nature of the capital one acquires may prove useful
in explaining likelihood of re-offending as compared to the explanation offered by
deterrence theory.
To examine factors that increase the likelihood of re-offending, this research will
use a sample of incarcerated adult offender to test two models: a deterrence model and a
2

proposed capital model. More specifically, this research will examine how an inmate’s
capital, both in the community and in prison, affect self-reported likelihood of reoffending upon release, and if these indicators are better suited for explaining offending
as compared to those included in the deterrence model.
Before testing the relative effects of community and prison capital, as well as
certainty and severity of punishment, on an offender’s likelihood of re-offending, this
research must first be placed in context. Since the 1970s, incarceration rates have risen
substantially (Alexander 2010; Pettit and Lyons 2009; Western 2007; Wright 2010). This
period of mass imprisonment has not only increased the number of people serving time in
prison, but it has also increased the number of offenders who are returning to their
communities (Mears and Mestre 2012; West et al. 2010). The fact that two-thirds of
these released offenders will be rearrested within three years reiterates the importance of
this study, but it also suggests that the theoretical traditions that influenced the rise of
imprisonment rates should be reexamined (Langan and Levin 2002).
In the following chapter, previous literature related to re-offending, including
mass imprisonment, recidivism, deterrence, and social stratification, will be discussed.
This information will provide a reference for which to understand the deterrence and
proposed capital model frameworks as well as to interpret the statistical findings.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to review previous research related to mass
imprisonment, recidivism, deterrence, and social stratification. Before delving into
deterrence and social stratification research, literature on mass imprisonment and
recidivism will be discussed.
The United States is currently experiencing a period of mass imprisonment that is
unprecedented, not only in the United States, but also throughout the modern world
(Western 2007; Pettit and Lyons 2009; Alexander 2010). Between 1925 and 1973, the
incarceration rate of the United States was around 100 per 100,000, similar to rates of
Western European nations today; however, the United States now has an incarceration
rate of over 600 per 100,000 adults (Carson and Golinelli 2013). The policies associated
with mass imprisonment were meant to incapacitate and deter offenders, as well as the
general public, from future criminality; however, the review of associated literature calls
into question prison’s supposed deterrent effect (Wright 2010; Petersilia 2003).
Mass Imprisonment
According to Garland (2001), there are two defining features of mass
imprisonment. First, there are markedly high rates of imprisonment. Second, there is
systematic incarceration of whole groups of people. The prison and jail population rose
4

by more than 500 percent between 1970 and 2000, and this increase in incarceration
disproportionately affected young black males from urban areas (Mauer 2003a; Roberts
2004; Mauer 2003b; King et al. 2005; Alexander 2010). In 2012, black males were 6
times more likely than white males, and Hispanic males were 2.5 times more likely than
white males, to be incarcerated (Carson and Golinelli 2012). When 30 percent of all
black males can expect to spend some of their lives in prison, as compared to 4 percent of
whites and 14 percent of Hispanics, it is obvious that one particular group of people is
disproportionately targeted or affected by mass imprisonment (Western 2007). It is also
important to note that women have been negatively impacted by mass imprisonment. In
1977, the incarceration rate for women in the United States was 10 out of every 100,000
females, but in 2012, this rate had increased to 63 out of every 100,000 females (Frost et
al. 2006; Carson and Golinelli 2012).
Between 2000 and 2008, the growth of the prison population slowed to just 1.8
percent per year on average, down from an average of 6.5 percent per year during the
1990s (Sabol et al. 2009). Since 2008, the U.S. prison population has been in decline.
This is largely due to the number of inmates who are being released from prison. In
2012, the number or releases outnumbered the number of admissions for the fourth
consecutive year (Carson and Golinelli 2012). The trends of recent years may signal a
positive change in correctional policy; however, the massive number of people being
released from prison will bring additional problems. Problems of reentry and recidivism
must be addressed to ensure that those released offenders will not return to prison once
again, reiterating the importance of this study.

5

Causes of Mass Imprisonment
Mass imprisonment is not an instituted policy in and of itself. Instead, mass
imprisonment is the result of several policies and decisions made over time (Petersilia
2003; Wright 2010; King et al. 2005; Mauer 2011). Initially, rising crime rates during the
1960s and 1970s may have led to an increase in incarceration, but an analysis of crime
and incarceration rates during the 1980s and 1990s suggests that only 12 percent of the
increase in incarceration rates can be attributed to changes in crime (Blumstein and Beck
1999; Mauer 2003a). Blumstein and Beck (1999) suggest that 88 percent of the rise in
incarceration rates was actually due to changes in sentencing policies.
Prior to the 1970s, judges had discretion in determining the type and duration of
an offender’s punishment (Mauer 2001). But with the adoption of policies such as
mandatory sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strikes, judges were forced to
impose sentences of a given type and duration according to the crime committed (Mauer
2003a; Frost 2006; Roberts 2004). Changes in sentencing policy, the “war on drugs,”
and a political “get tough on crime” atmosphere have not only drawn the attention of law
enforcement officials to make more drug-related arrests, but these factors have also
caused more judges to convict and impose lengthier sentences (Mauer 2005; Garland
2001; Stevenson 2011; Spohn and Holleran 2002). Because of this, there are greater
numbers of people entering the system and staying in the system for longer periods of
time.
The rationale behind this shift in policy is based on two distinct arguments. Some
believe that the imposition of mandatory and severe sentences should affect potential
offenders’ decisions to commit crime by changing their cost-benefit calculation of the
6

benefits associated with criminal activity (Durlauf and Nagin 2011; Wright 2010;
Petersilia 2003; Spohn and Holleran 2002). In this way, incarcerating more offenders for
lengthier periods of time could have a deterrent effect. Another argument for the shift in
policies contends that offenders will be unable to commit further crimes, at least while
they are incarcerated (Durlauf and Nagin 2011; Petersilia 2003; Levitt 2004). This goal
of incarceration is referred to as incapacitation. By incapacitating larger numbers of
people for longer periods of time, there should be a reduction in crime rates; however, the
relationship between mass imprisonment and crime rates is complex.
Spelman (2000) reports that about 25 percent of the drop in violent crime can be
attributed to mass imprisonment, but the greatest decrease in crime rates can be attributed
to other factors. One study suggests that the strong economy in the 1990s, which
produced jobs and opportunities for low-wage workers, contributed to a 30 percent
decline in crime rates (Freeman and Rogers 1999). Other studies suggest that decreases
in crime can be attributed to changes in the crack cocaine drug market (Musto 1999;
Levitt 2004). Also, community policing strategies have contributed to falling crime rates,
decreasing crime rates in San Diego alone by more than 40 percent (Eck and Maguire
2000).
Research suggests that the reliance on mass incarceration as a means to decrease
crime rates may not be as effective as other interventions (Heckman et al. 2010; Piquero
et al. 2009; King et al. 2005). Investments in drug treatment and school completion
programs prove to be more cost-effective than investments in incarceration and
enforcement approaches (Aos et al. 2001; Aos 2005; Rydell and Everingham 1994;
Caulkins et al. 1997). Investments in early childhood development programs have also
7

been shown to reduce criminality (Heckman et al. 2010; Piquero et al. 2009). Such
findings call into question whether the crime reducing benefits of mass incarceration are
worth the financial and social toll that is exacted on society, especially when alternatives
have proven useful in reducing crime at a lower financial and social cost to individuals
and their communities (Durlauf and Nagin; Aos et al. 2001).
Effects of Mass Imprisonment
According to the Pew Research Center for the States (2011), current estimates
suggest that about 1 in 100 adults are in custody in the United States; however,
incarceration rates are not evenly distributed across racial, gender, class, and age lines
(Mauer 2003b; Mauer 2011). Over 90 percent of all prison and jail inmates in the United
States are male, and about two-thirds of prisoners are between the ages of 18 and 35
(Western 2007). According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2013), African Americans and
Hispanics combined make up approximately 30 percent of the U.S. population, yet twothirds of prisoners in the U.S. are African American or Hispanic. Also, African
American men are six to eight times more likely to be incarcerated than are whites
(Western 2007; Carson and Golinelli 2012). Approximately one-third of African
American males will spend time in prison during their lifetimes (Bonczar 2003).
Racial disparities in incarceration rates become more striking when you consider
levels of education (Pettit and Western 2004). In 2000, one in three young African
American high school dropouts were incarcerated, compared to just 1 in 25 collegeeducated African Americans (Western 2007). In general, on any given day, ten percent
of African American men are incarcerated, and of those without a high school diploma,
8

60 percent can expect to spend time in prison during their lifetimes (Pettit and Lyons
2009; Pew Center for the States 2011; Pettit and Western 2004).
Spending time in prison can have negative effects on individuals in regard to
employment and wages (Freeman 1992; Grogger 1995; Pettit and Lyons 2007; Waldfogel
1994; Western and Beckett 1999; Western et al. 2001; Pager 2003, Western 2002,
Western 2006), health (Binswanger et al. 2007, London and Myers 2006), and political
participation (Manza and Uggen 2006, Alexander 2010). In addition to the negative
effects incarceration has on individuals, the removal of large numbers of offenders from a
particular area can have negative effects on their families and communities (Clear 2007).
When removing offenders from the community, one not only removes the
negative aspects, such as the crime for which these individuals are responsible, but also
the positive elements, such as the emotional and financial support to families, that the
particular offenders may provide (Clear et al. 2003, Clear 2007). Rose and Clear (1998)
refer to this process as “coercive mobility.” The idea behind coercive mobility, drawing
from social disorganization theory, is that areas with high rates of outward mobility will
lack a stable infrastructure to sustain levels of informal social control; therefore, crime
will flourish in these communities (Clear et al. 2003; Frost and Gross 2012; Clear 2007;
Rose and Clear 1998). Though mass incarceration has undoubtedly affected the entire
nation, it seems that Southern states, as compared to states in other regions, are feeling
the impact of this. Of the 14 states with higher than national average incarceration rates,
ten of them are in the South (Harrison and Beck, 2006).
Policies over the last few decades that led to our current phenomenon of mass
imprisonment have been particularly tough on African Americans and women (Christian
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and Thomas 2009; Western 2007; Mauer 1999; Wacquant 2001; Pettit and Western 2004;
Stevenson 2011; Joseph and Pearson 2002; Chesney-Lind 2002; Frost et al. 2006). The
“war on drugs” is largely to blame for increased levels of incarceration for both African
Americans and females (Roberts 2004; Mauer 2003a; Mauer 2003b; Duke 2009;
Stevenson 2011; Mauer 1999). With this in mind, causes and consequences of
imprisonment for these two groups will be examined, paying particular attention to the
role that drugs play in their situations.
African Americans and Mass Imprisonment
On any given day, one out of every three African American males in their
twenties is either in prison or jail, on probation, or serving parole (Mauer 1999;
Wacquant 2001). In all, incarceration rates for African Americans are about eight times
higher than the rates for whites (Pettit and Western 2004). One explanation for the racial
disparity in incarceration rates examines the disproportionate effects of the “war on
drugs” (Stevenson 2011). Pettit and Western (2004) suggest that the decline in
occupational opportunities in inner cities made low-skilled workers more vulnerable to
the “get tough on crime” and “war on drugs” policies. Because they lack opportunities, it
makes sense that disadvantaged African American men would turn to drugs and criminal
lifestyles. Joseph and Pearson (2002) link drug use to the social environment. The
authors suggest that living in deteriorated neighborhoods, facing racism from whites, and
generally lacking economic opportunity could influence blacks to look to drugs to help
them escape their circumstances (Joseph and Pearson 2002). African Americans may
also turn to crime in general and drugs in particular because of the financial gains
associated with them. Especially in urban areas, an inner-city youth can make more
10

selling drugs in a day than he or she can make working at a fast-food restaurant in a
month (Joseph and Pearson 2002).
In addition to imprisonment, convicted felons face additional punishments
imposed by law of which many people are unaware (Travis 2002; Petersilia 2003). These
additional consequences have been termed “invisible punishments” (Travis 2002; Mauer
2003b). Many states deny convicted felons the right to vote, and some states terminate
parental rights of convicted felons and consider a felony conviction as grounds for a
divorce (Mauer 2003b; Buckler and Travis 2003; Petersilia 2003). In many states,
convicted felons are denied the ability to run for public office or serve on a jury
(Petersilia 2003). In addition to these punishments, some states require that anyone ever
convicted of a felony register with local law enforcement (Buckler and Travis 2003;
Petersilia 2003).
Some of the most severe punishments, not only for convicted felons, but also for
their families, are those related to welfare and public housing. A welfare reform act in
1996 imposed a lifetime ban from assistance and food stamps for those with felony drug
convictions (Mauer 2003b; Petersilia 2003). There were no exemptions from this ban,
not even for pregnant women or those suffering from HIV/AIDS (Rubinstein and
Mukamal 2002, Buckler and Travis 2003). In 1996, there were also changes in the
admission and eviction standards for public housing. According to Rubinstein and
Mukamel (2002), those applying for public housing had to go through extensive
background checks, and if they were permitted housing, they could be evicted for any
activity viewed to affect the health and safety of other residents. This also provided that
an entire family could be evicted if one person in the household was using drugs or
11

involved in criminal activity (Rubinstein and Mukamal 2002; Petersilia 2003). Such
punishments not only affect the convicted offender, but they also affect their family
members.
Many offenders are denied the proper avenues to better themselves upon release.
Drug offenders are denied loans for higher education (Mauer 2003b). In some states,
convicted offenders can be denied licensure for certain occupations and may not be
employed in certain areas such as child care, teaching, health care, and others (Petersilia
2003). If released offenders are not allowed to participate in society, they may lose
respect for a legal system that stands to represent that society (Travis 2002).
Such punishments particularly affect African Americans from lower class
communities (Mauer 2003b). Because the mass imprisonment phenomenon has
specifically targeted African-American communities, 1 out of every 14 black children has
a parent in prison. Since their parents’ rights for betterment may be dissolved, it seems
likely that these children will live in extreme poverty (Mauer 2003b; Travis 2002). When
administering punishment, one must consider the recipient of the punishment. Most of
the time, it is not only the offender who is receiving the punishment. It is often those
close to the offender who are punished most severely for a crime that they did not commit
(Braman 2007).
Women and Mass Imprisonment
Mass imprisonment has also disproportionately affected females in the United
States. Between 1980 and 2011, the incarceration rate for females increased 587 percent
(Carson and Sabol 2012). Between 1995 and 2004, female imprisonment rates jumped
36 percent, while the imprisonment rate for men went up only 17 percent (Frost et al.
12

2006). Incarceration rates vary by state, and several states, including the state of
Mississippi, have female inmate populations that are 20 times higher than they were in
1977 (Frost et al. 2006). Nationally, 65 out of every 100,000 women are in prison
(Carson and Sabol 2012).
In general, women have a 1 in 56 chance of being sent to prison in their lifetime;
however, the likelihood of being imprisoned varies according to race (Bonczar 2003).
African American women have a 1 in 19 chance of being incarcerated in their lifetime as
compared to a 1 in 118 chance for white women (Bonczar 2003). The incarceration rate
for African American women is 2.5 times higher than that of white women (Carson and
Sabol 2012). It is important to note that the gap in incarceration rates for African
American and white women has been decreasing in recent years, with white women
seeing increases in their rates of incarceration and African American women seeing
declines (Goode 2013; Sabol and Couture 2008).
Even though the population of women inmates has increased, it is important to
note that most women are serving time for property and drug offenses, as opposed to
violent crimes prior to 1980 (Chesney-Lind 2002; Frost et al. 2006). One explanation for
women’s increasing incarceration rate is the “feminization of poverty” (Naffine 1987;
Belknap 2001). In general, women in society are more likely to be poor than are men.
Several phenomena have contributed to this disparity, including the dual labor market, in
which women are disproportionately employed in low wage jobs, high rates of divorce
and single women with children, and high costs of medical care, housing, and child care
(Eitzen and Smith 2009). Property and drug crimes may represent opportunities to make
ends meet, especially when legitimate economic opportunities for women are weak.
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According to Diaz-Cotto (1996), women’s drug selling is an indicator of the feminization
of poverty.
Some of the factors that have contributed to the rapid increase in female
incarceration rates may be unique to women, but much of the growth in the women’s
prison population is due to the same factors that have influenced the overall prison
population growth in the United States. Mandatory sentencing and the “war on drugs”
have widened the net of offenders and have increased the amount of time that these
offenders will actually spend behind bars (Frost et al. 2006; Chesney-Lind 2002).
Chesney-Lind (1997) claims that the “war on drugs” has become a “war on women,”
leading to an increase in female incarceration rates.
Researchers have found several other factors related to the incarceration of
women (Christian and Thomas 2009; Frost et al. 2006; Greenfeld and Snell 1999).
According to Greenfeld and Snell (1999), almost half of women offenders have never
been married, the majority have never completed high school or obtained a GED, and 70
percent of these women have children under the age of 18. Also, women offenders tend
to come from poverty stricken communities that lack social support systems (Holtfreder
et al. 2006). Female offenders are disproportionately victims of physical and sexual
abuse as children, and 44 percent of women offenders report being sexually or physically
assaulted during their lifetimes (Greenfeld and Snell 1999; Harlow 1999). Also, physical
and mental health problems, along with substance abuse, plague female offenders (Frost
et al. 2006; James and Glaze 2006; Peters et al. 1998; Messina and Grella 2006). Forty
percent of female offenders, compared to just 32 percent of male offenders, report being
under the influence of drugs at the time of crime commission (Greenfeld and Snell 1999).
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Also, approximately 30 percent of female offenders report receiving welfare assistance
right before their arrest (Greenfeld and Snell 1999).
The effects of mass incarceration produce unique challenges for women in regard
to their families. Women overwhelmingly tend to be the sole caregivers of children as
compared to men in the system (Townhead 2006). Over 80 percent of mothers in prison
want to reunite with their children upon release; however, this wish is extremely difficult
given that less than half of incarcerated mothers actually receive visits from their children
while behind bars (Frost et al. 2006). Incarceration of male and female family members
has consequences for their families, yet the incarceration of mothers, especially single
mothers, causes their children a heightened experience of trauma and anxiety (Roberts
2012; Murray and Farrington 2008; Petersilia 2003). Often, children of incarcerated
women are moved around from one caregiver to the next, and they tend to be separated
from their siblings (Richie 2002, Frost et al. 2006, Pogrebin and Dodge 2001; Roberts
2012).
Even if incarcerated women attempt to be reunited with their children upon
release, they face additional restrictions in the arenas of public housing, welfare, financial
aid for education, and employment (Peterisilia 2003). Allard (2002) explains how those
convicted of felony drug offenses may receive a lifetime ban from federal welfare
benefits. This ban is especially detrimental to women since this type of assistance may
be all they have to support themselves and their families after release. If released female
offenders have access to welfare and other forms of social support to address their shortterm needs, such as housing and food, then their odds of re-offending decrease by 83
percent (Holtfreter et al. 2006). Given that these women will have no skills, no jobs, no
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housing or welfare benefits, they will be ill-prepared to resume familial responsibilities
and will quite often have their parental rights terminated (Pogrebin and Dodge 2001,
Allard 2002, Frost et al. 2006; Dodge and Pogrebin 2001; Petersilia 2003).
Clearly, the punishment of incarcerated women, in many cases, is a form of
punishment for their entire family. Because women are more often convicted of nonviolent offenses and they have lower recidivism rates than men, they may be better
candidates for community-based sanctions (Immarigeon and Chesney-Lind 1992; Frost et
al. 2006). If women are able to maintain ties to their family and community, either
through visitation in prison or by serving a community based sanction, they may be less
likely to re-offend (Bales and Mears 2008).
The consequences of mass imprisonment would be more palatable if there was
evidence that such high rates of incarceration deter criminality in previous and potential
offenders. The reality is that mass imprisonment has not been shown to dramatically
decrease crime rates in society, and when acknowledging the rather high levels of reoffending, it becomes apparent that incarceration does not decrease criminality in
offenders either (Langan and Levin 2002; Spelman 2000).
The next section of this research seeks to examine why such high rates of
incarceration do not seem to have a deterrent effect on future offending. The historical
foundations of deterrence theory will first be discussed. Then, the basic principles of
deterrence theory will be independently addressed in order to understand their utility in
explaining offending.
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Incarceration and Deterrence
One of the major goals of tougher sentencing policies over the past few decades
has been deterrence, but deterrence has not always been a major research agenda or
sentencing goal (Wright 2010; Petersilia 2003). In the following section, the historical
foundations of deterrence theory will be discussed.
History of Deterrence Research
The conceptual foundations for deterrence and rational choice theories are drawn
from the classic works of Cesare Beccaria (1764) and Jeremy Bentham (1789). In On
Crimes and Punishment, Beccaria (1764) argued that punishment should be proportionate
to the crime committed. In other words, crimes that cause the most harm to society
should be punished more severely than crimes that cause less harm. In addition,
punishments that are certain to occur, severe enough to offset any anticipated gains from
crime, and occur soon after the crime, should prevent crime from occurring (Beccaria
1764). Beccaria (1764) asserted that it was more important to prevent crimes than to
punish them, and the best way to prevent crimes was with clearly defined laws associated
with certain, swift, and proportionate punishments. Beccaria’s work served as a guide on
how to make legal systems more efficient and rational, and he did discuss the
characteristics of punishment that form the foundation of deterrence; however, he
provided no fully developed theory of criminal behavior (Paternoster 2010). On the other
hand, Bentham (1789) offered a more developed theory of human behavior that serves as
the foundation for rational choice theory (Paternoster 2010).
In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham (1789)
argued that all human behavior is guided by two goals: maximizing pleasure and
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minimizing pain. When faced with alternative courses of action, man will choose the one
in which the benefits outweigh the associated costs (Bentham 1789). In discussing pain
and pleasure, or costs and benefits, associated with crime, Bentham (1789) argued that
there are four sources: physical, political, moral, and religious. In regard to crime, a
potential physical pleasure would be the financial gain from breaking into someone else’s
home. A potential physical pain may come from injuries sustained during crime
commission. Political pain comes from the legal sanctions one may encounter after
criminal activity. Moral pleasure and pain may come from the reputation one receives
after crime commission, albeit good or bad. Religious sources of pain and pleasure refer
to anticipated rewards or damnation in the afterlife. These sources of pain and pleasure
are an important addition to our understanding of human behavior in general, and crime
in particular, because they provide not only for legal sanctions, but also informal
sanctions, that an offender may consider in his or her decision to commit crime
(Paternoster 2010). Even though Beccaria and Bentham offered fairly well-developed
explanations of the causes of crime at the end of the 18th century, their ideas were largely
ignored in favor of more biological and psychological explanations of criminal behavior
that attributed crime to defects of particular individuals, not to the shortcomings of
society (Rafter 2008; Paternoster 2010).
Deterrence theory was largely ignored by generations of criminologists, but
separate works by Gary Becker and Jack Gibbs brought deterrence back to the forefront.
Becker (1968) argued that crime could be understood like any kind of economic activity,
through a cost-benefit analysis. Becker (1968), like Bentham (1789), believed that
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people would choose crime over alternative courses of action when the benefits, or
pleasure, derived from crime exceed the costs, or pain, associated with crime.
Gibbs (1968) was less interested in the utilitarian ideas offered by both Bentham
(1789) and Becker (1968) and more concerned with whether legal sanctions actually
reduced crimes. To test the effects of certainty and severity of punishment, Gibbs (1968)
examined crime rates in various states. He found that states with higher levels of
certainty and severity of punishment had lower homicide rates. By finding empirical
support for deterrence theory, Gibbs (1968) sparked interest in deterrence research among
sociologists and criminologists. By the mid-1970s, deterrence research was prominent in
the field of criminology (Paternoster 2010).
More than two centuries after Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789) introduced
deterrence and rational choice concepts, Stafford and Warr (1993) observed that
traditional notions of deterrence focused only on the effects of being punished and largely
ignored the effects of avoiding punishment. The experience of avoiding punishment for a
crime that was committed may do as much, or more, to encourage crime commission as
the experience of receiving punishment does to deter criminal behavior (Stafford and
Warr 1993). People are deterred from future criminality by a combination of personal
experience with receiving or avoiding punishment (specific deterrence) and vicarious
experience of others receiving or avoiding punishment (general deterrence) (Stafford and
Warr 1993; Sitren and Applegate 2012). Receiving punishment, or knowing of others
who have received punishment, should decrease likelihood of offending. Also, having
avoided punishment, or knowing of others who have avoided punishment, should
increase likelihood of offending.
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In the following section, the basic principles of deterrence theory will be
addressed in regard to their relevance and utility in explaining offending. More
specifically, the following section will explain why the certainty and severity of
punishment, along with prior punishment, may not adequately deter potential offenders
from criminal activity.
Principles of Deterrence Theory
For the policies associated with mass imprisonment to have a deterrent effect,
they must be perceived as certain to occur and severe enough to outweigh any benefits
that would come from the commission of crime. In addition, potential offenders must
have knowledge of a particular sanction, and they must have certain beliefs about that
sanction if it is to factor into their criminal decisions (Beyleveld 1979; Kirk et al. 1980;
Von Hirsch et al. 1999). In the United States, prison sentences are designed to deter, but
as the number of inmates has risen, there has been no substantial drop in crime that can
be directly related to mass imprisonment (King et al. 2005).
The idea that prison conditions are deplorable and threatening may hold true for
the majority of citizens, but one cannot assume that prison conditions will be received in
the same manner for the majority of offenders (Petersilia 1990). In designing sanctions,
law-makers have overlooked some very important facts. First of all, many offenders may
reject the norms of conventional society outright (Travis 2002; Petersilia 1990). Second,
most offenders come from communities with substandard living conditions (Pettit and
Western 2004; Joseph and Pearson 2002; Holtfreder et al. 2006). If offenders’ values,
norms, and standards differ from those of the majority of citizens, then their views of
particular sanctions may also differ.
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The next section will examine how the certainty of punishment is perceived by
different groups of people and if those perceptions of certainty affect likelihood of
offending.
Certainty
According to deterrence literature, people are deterred from committing crime if
the punishment for that crime is certain or likely to occur (Beyleveld 1979; Beccaria
1764; Wright 2010). Even if potential offenders believe that punishment is certain to
occur, that perceived certainty may affect different people in different ways. For
example, African Americans and whites should differ in their perceptions of certainty of
punishment because African Americans are more likely to be punished because of an
assumed racial bias in the criminal justice system (Fagan and Meares 2008). Given this,
it appears that African Americans would be less likely to self-report re-offending upon
release than whites due to their perceived certainty of punishment; however, perceived
certainty of punishment does not seem to deter all offenders equally.
It has been argued that prison sanctions would serve more as a deterrent if the
offender’s reputation or social standing was diminished in light of the punishment
(Zimring and Hawkins 1973). It is true, particularly in some communities, that going to
prison would injure a person’s reputation and social standing in that community;
however, we cannot assume that this happens in all communities. In fact, going to prison
may actually enhance some offenders’ statuses in their communities (Fleisher 1995).
Tunnell (1992) points out that criminal behavior is not looked down on by associates of
an offender because criminal behavior is not viewed as deviant, but as normal behavior.
Because almost one in three African American males will come under the control of the
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criminal justice system, going to prison is almost like a rite of passage, especially in the
African American community (Pettit and Western 2004, Irwin and Austin 1997, Garland
2001, Mauer 1999). Keeping these things in mind, it is unlikely that the certainty of
prison sanctions would serve as an equal deterrent for all offenders.
Along with perceptions of certainty of punishment, perceptions of sanction
severity should also affect potential offenders’ decisions on whether or not to participate
in criminal activity. The utility of sanction severity as a deterrent will now be discussed.
Severity
The notion of deterrence is mediated on the premise that more severe punishment
should deter most effectively. With the exception of capital punishment, incarceration in
general is assumed to be the most punitive sentence. However, research on the
perceptions of sanctions suggests this may no longer be a safe assumption (May and
Wood 2010; May et al. 2008; Wood and Grasmick 1999, Crouch 1993, Fleisher 1995,
Petersilia 1990, Petersilia and Deschenes, 1994a, Petersilia and Deschenes 1994b,
Spelman 1995, May et al. 2005; Wood and May 2003, Apospori and Alpert 1993).
There are many punishments, including probation, community service, day
reporting, intermittent incarceration, halfway house, electronic monitoring, day fine, boot
camp, county jail, and prison, that may be used to punish offenders. When considering a
continuum of sanction severity, one might assume that regular probation would be the
least severe, because it allows the offender to stay in the community and it does not
necessarily require him to hold down a job or attend treatment programs. Of course, the
offender is expected to meet certain requirements and is subject to searches and drug
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tests, but, for the most part, he or she is allowed to remain in the community and live a
normal life, at least compared to a life lived in prison.
Aside from regular probation, there are other sanctions that allow the offender to
remain in the community. The different sanctions have their own particular stipulations
and requirements, and the degree of supervision varies with each; however, alternative
sanctions, with the exception of county jail and boot camp, allow the offender to remain
in his or her community. By abiding by the conditions set forth in each alternative
sanction, the offender is able to avoid the seemingly harsh conditions associated with
prison life.
In light of such questions, research has been conducted to rank offenders’
perceptions of sanction severity (May and Wood 2010; May et al. 2008; Wood and
Grasmick 1999; Crouch 1993; Fleisher 1995; Petersilia 1990; Petersilia and Deschenes
1994a; Petersilia and Deschenes 1994b; Spelman 1995; May et al. 2005; Wood and May
2003, Apospori and Alpert 1993). Research has found that some offenders would rather
serve a prison sentence and be released than waste time serving alternative sanctions with
many tough stipulations, increasing the risk that they will not meet some condition and be
revoked to prison anyway (Petersilia 1990). Wood and Grasmick (1999) found that
nearly 30 percent of all male inmates would prefer to serve a brief prison sentence over
any amount of intensive supervision probation (ISP). May and Wood (2010), Spelman
(1995), and Wood and Grasmick (1999) found evidence that offenders do not rank prison
as the most severe sanction. Spelman (1995) found that 75 percent of offenders rated at
least one intermediate sanction as more severe than incarceration. Wood and Grasmick
(1999) came up with a ranking of sanctions according to the degree of severity that
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offenders associated with them. Offenders consistently ranked prison as less severe than
boot camp, county jail, and day reporting. It seems that many offenders view alternative
sanctions as a gamble (Wood and May 2003). If they fail to meet a condition, they are
revoked back to prison. Many would prefer to serve their time without being harassed by
probation officers and other officials (Applegate 2014). In reviewing the literature, it
appears that probation and imprisonment do not fall on the low and high ends of the
continuum of sanction severity (Morris and Tonry 1990; Wood and May 2003; May and
Wood 2010).
In addition to the fact that offenders may rank alternative sanctions as more
severe than prison, researchers have also found that preferences for certain sanctions vary
by offender characteristics (May and Wood 2010; Spelman 1995; Apospori and Alpert
1993; Petersilia and Deschenes 1994b; Crouch 1993; Wood and Grasmick 1999;
Applegate 2014). In regard to age, older offenders seem to prefer prison over probation
(Crouch 1993; Spelman 1995). Petersilia and Deschenes (1994a, 1994b) found that
married offenders, and those who had children, ranked prison as more severe than their
single counterparts. This may help to explain why Wood and Grasmick (1999) and May
and Wood (2010) found significant gender differences in rankings of sanction severity
and willingness to serve alternative sanctions. Differences were also found in offenders’
perceptions of sanction severity when considering previous incarceration experience.
Spelman (1995) and May and Wood (2010) found that those who had served a previous
prison term were more likely to choose another prison term over intensive supervision
probation, and Wood and Grasmick (1999) found that offenders who had experienced
alternative sanctions were more likely to rank those particular sanctions as more severe.
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This is further evidence that society’s perceptions of sanction severity should be called
into question.
One of the most significant differences in the perceptions of sanction severity
comes from race. Crouch (1993) and Spelman (1995) find that race is the strongest
predictor of prison preferences. Crouch (1993) contends that African Americans adjust
better to prison than whites because of their relationships to those already in prison. It is
fairly common for African Americans to find friends and relatives in prison who could
provide them with information, protection, as well as material goods (Crouch 1993).
Also, African Americans coming from urban areas may already be used to the violence
and deprivations that are associated with prison terms (Crouch 1993). Applegate (2014)
contends that African Americans are less likely to perceive prison as a severe sanction,
especially if they are from neighborhoods with high incarceration rates. Due to these
reasons, African Americans may adjust better to prison life and may be more likely to
choose prison, as compared to whites, if given alternatives.
May and Wood (2010), Wood and May (2003), May et al. (2005), and May et al.
(2003) offer further evidence to Crouch’s claim. Wood and May (2003) found that
African Americans were more likely than whites to choose prison rather than an
alternative. In fact, they found that whites were willing to serve two times the amount of
an alternative than were African Americans to avoid specific amounts of time in prison
(Wood and May 2003). Not only are whites less likely to choose prison over alternatives,
but they are also more likely to do significantly more time of an alternative than are
African Americans to avoid prison.
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To better understand the reasons for sanction preference, Wood and May (2003)
asked offenders how important certain reasons were for avoiding alternative sanctions.
The most important reason to avoid alternative sanctions was that failure to complete the
alternative would land one back in prison, and this seemed important to both African
Americans and whites (Wood and May 2003). African Americans, more so than whites,
reported that officers are too harsh while serving alternatives, they are abusive, and they
try to revoke one back to prison. African Americans were also more likely to report that
serving a prison sentence is less of a hassle than is serving an alternative sanction, and 37
percent of African Americans, compared to 24.5 percent of whites reported that “in
general, living in prison is easier than living outside prison” (Wood and May 2003).
Such statements offer proof that offenders differ in their perceived severity of prison
sanctions, and these perceptions may affect their likelihood of re-offending upon release.
The purpose of discussing prison versus alternative sanctions is to show that
offenders differ in their views of sanction severity. Many offenders do not view prison as
a severe sanction, at least in comparison to other sanctions that would allow the offender
to remain in the community. This leads one to wonder if there are structural conditions in
society at large as compared to prison society that would cause an offender to view prison
as less severe. Regardless of the reasons, one must be careful in assuming that the
severity of prison sanctions would deter an inmate from re-offending.
Prior Punishment
Besides perceived certainty and severity of punishment, an offender’s experience
with receiving or avoiding punishment should affect likelihood of re-offending (Stafford
and Warr 1993). Receiving punishment, or knowing of others who have received
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punishment, should decrease likelihood of offending. Also, having avoided punishment,
or knowing of others who have avoided punishment, should increase likelihood of
offending. Having received prior punishment should also serve as a deterrent by
increasing perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment. If one commits a
crime and is punished for that crime, then the costs associated with that crime should
outweigh the benefits of committing that crime. Research has shown that this is not
necessarily the case. When considering previous incarceration, Spelman (1995) found
that those who had served a previous prison term were more likely to choose another
prison term over intensive supervision probation. This is further evidence that society’s
perceptions of sanction severity and the deterrent effect of prior punishment should be
called into question.
Clearly, the certainty and severity of punishment, along with prior punishment do
not deter all offenders equally. The next section will further examine the utility of the
basic elements of deterrence theory by reviewing previous empirical research.
Deterrence Research
If incarceration has a deterrent effect, there should be an inverse relationship
between imprisonment and crime (Paternoster 2010; Bhati and Piquero 2008; Listwan et
al. 2013). Numerous studies have examined the effect of imprisonment on crime rates
(Kleiman 2009; Raphael and Stoll 2009; Hughes et al. 2001; Langan and Levin 2002;
Nieuwbeerta et al. 2009; Spohn and Holleran 2002; Cullen et al. 2011; Nagin et al. 2009).
Evidence of imprisonment having a deterrent effect comes from Levitt (1996), Levitt
(2004), and Spelman (2000). Levitt (1996) suggests that for each additional year of
imprisonment, fifteen index crimes are prevented. This may exemplify a general
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deterrent effect; however, one cannot rule out that the decrease in index crimes is due to
an incapacitation effect (Listwan et al. 2013). In other words, those who are locked in
prison are unable to commit crimes while incarcerated. This does not necessarily mean
that they are deterred from doing so. Spelman (2000) indicates that for every 10 percent
increase in incarceration there was a 2-4 percent decline in crime. Levitt (2004) suggests
that at least one third of the decline in crime rates between 1990 and 2000 was due to the
use of imprisonment.
Reentry literature, showing high rates of recidivism, suggest that imprisonment
does not deter offenders from future criminality (Langan and Levin 2002; Petersilia 2003;
Hughes et al. 2001). Studies evaluating the effectiveness of prison versus community
sanctions suggest that prison does not deter crime any more than do community
sanctions, and prison was also shown to have a criminogenic effect (Wood 2007; May
and Wood 2010; Cullen et al. 2011; Nagin et al. 2009).
Research also examines the relative effects of the severity and certainty of
punishment on offending. In general, research shows that increasing the certainty of
punishment has a more pronounced deterrent effect than increasing the severity of
punishment (Wright 2010; Nagin and Pogarsky 2001). Nevertheless, a number of studies
link perceived certainty of punishment and increased crime rates, especially in areas
where the stigma associated with going to prison is low (Hirschfield 2008; Nagin 1998).
In regard to sentence severity, research fails to support its deterrent effect (Doob and
Webster 2003; Gendreau et al. 1996). In a review of 50 studies testing the effect of
severity on re-offending, Gendreau et al. (1999) found that lengthier sentences actually
increased likelihood of re-offending.
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Studies have also tested the effects of punishment experiences on likelihood of
offending. Three studies found nonsignificant relationships between prior punishment
and self-reported likelihood of offending (Piquero and Pogarsky 2002; Sitren and
Applegate 2007; Piquero and Paternoster 1998). Having been stopped by the police
while driving under the influence was not shown to affect likelihood of doing so in the
future (Piquero and Pogarsky 2002). Also, having been caught cheating on an exam had
no significant effect on likelihood of cheating in the future (Sitren and Applegate 2007).
Piquero and Paternoster (1998), using secondary data, failed to find a significant
relationship between previous arrests and driving under the influence.
Several studies have found significant relationships between prior punishment and
likelihood of future offending; however, these studies showed effects that were opposite
of those predicted by deterrence theory (Wood 2007; May and Wood 2010; Piquero and
Paternoster 1998; Paternoster and Piquero 1995; Sitren and Applegate 2006). Having
been stopped while under the influence was shown to actually increase likelihood of that
behavior in the future (Piquero and Paternoster 1998; Sitren and Applegate 2006). Also,
Paternoster and Piquero (1995) demonstrated that high school students were more likely
to use drugs and alcohol if they had prior contact with the criminal justice system.
Wood (2007) further examines this “positive punishment effect” using an inmate
population, as opposed to using high school students or those involved in relatively minor
offenses. Measures of past punishment experiences, having previously served time in a
juvenile facility, having previously served time in an adult facility, total months served
prior to current incarceration, and number of alternative sanctions ever served, had a
significant and positive effect on likelihood of re-offending; however, measures of
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current punishment had a significant negative relationship with likelihood of reoffending.
Research examining the effect of vicarious punishment experiences on likelihood
of re-offending does not support predictions made by deterrence theory. Two studies
found a nonsignificant effect of others being punished on an offender’s likelihood of
cheating (Sitren and Applegate 2007) and driving under the influence (Sitren and
Applegate 2006). Piquero and Paternoster (1998) found that knowing of friends being
arrested for driving under the influence actually increased the likelihood that respondents
would do so in the future.
Several studies also examined the effect of punishment avoidance on likelihood of
offending and found both specific and general deterrent effects. Juveniles who had
avoided punishment for using drugs and alcohol were more likely to use drugs and
alcohol in the future (Paternoster and Piquero 1995). Those who had avoided punishment
for cheating on college exams were more likely to do so in the future (Sitren and
Applegate 2007). Also, those who had driven under the influence and never been caught
were more likely to continue to do so in the future (Piquero and Paternoster 1998;
Piquero and Pogarsky 2002; Sitren and Applegate 2006). Knowing of others who had
avoided punishment was also shown to increase likelihood of offending (Piquero and
Pogarsky 2002; Sitren and Applegate 2006; Sitren and Applegate 2007).
One limitation of deterrence studies that have tested the effects of punishment
experiences as conceptualized by Stafford and Warr (1993) is that they do not use
offender samples to draw their conclusions. The study by Sitren and Applegate (2012)
tests Stafford and Warr’s (1993) deterrence propositions on an offender population. In
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contrast to prior studies, Sitren and Applegate (2012) determined that personal or
vicarious avoidance of punishment did not lead to an increase in offending.
The Sitren and Applegate (2012) study thus shows that the threat of punishment may
have less of a deterrent effect on criminally prone individuals than on law-abiding
citizens (Pratt et al. 2006; Wright et al. 2004; Piliavin 1986; Decker et al. 1993).
Another limitation of deterrence research in general is that it tends to focus on the
formal costs and benefits associated with crime commission, paying less attention to the
informal costs and benefits that may factor into one’s decision to commit crime
(Grasmick and Bursik 1990). If offenders only experience formal punishment for their
crimes, such as prison time, and they do not experience informal consequences, such as
shame, loss of job, or loss of important relationships, then they may not be deterred by
the threat of punishment (Sitren and Applegate 2012). Future research should examine if
and how formal and informal consequences affect likelihood of re-offending. Research
should also focus on how these consequences affect offender populations, especially
when using research to inform sentencing policy.
Considering that incarceration does not deter offenders equally from future
offending and that previous empirical research on deterrence has not consistently shown
support for the theory either, one must consider another possibility: imprisonment may
actually increase likelihood of re-offending. This positive relationship between
incarceration and likelihood of re-offending will be discussed in the following section.
Recidivism
According to Pew Center on the States (2011: 7), “Recidivism is the act of
reengaging in criminal offending despite having been punished.” In other words, re31

offending, or recidivism, refers to the commission of at least one crime after being
incarcerated (Nagin et al. 2009). Recidivism rates may reflect the proportion of released
offenders who are re-arrested, reconvicted, resentenced to prison, and those who return to
prison with or without a new sentence (Langan and Levin 2002). One must be mindful of
this when comparing recidivism rates. Recidivism studies typically follow offenders for
three years after release from prison (Pew Center on the States 2011).
Recidivism Studies
The Bureau of Justice Statistics released results from one of the largest recidivism
studies ever conducted, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994. This report, written
by Langan and Levin in 2002, had several important findings. The authors found that 67
percent of released inmates were rearrested within three years of their release date. Of
those who were released, 47 percent were convicted of a new crime, and 25 percent
returned to prison for a new crime that was committed. When including those who had
technical violations with those who committed new crimes, about 52 percent of released
offenders returned to prison within three years (Langan and Levin 2002).
Langan and Levin (2002) also found that recidivism rates vary by offense type.
Offenders who had committed property crimes had the highest recidivism rate (73.8%),
followed by drug offenders (66.7%). Violent offenders had the lowest recidivism rate
(61.7%). When examining recidivism rates by offense type, it appears that those who
were imprisoned for crimes motivated by money or property were more likely to reoffend than those who were not motivated by material gain (Langan and Levin 2002).
According to Langan and Levin (2002), 30 percent of released inmates were rearrested within the first six months of release and 44 percent were re-arrested within the
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first year of release. This “two-thirds rearrest rate” has been documented since 1969,
when Daniel Glaser published The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System
(Petersilia 2003: 141). Several other national studies on recidivism have been conducted
since that time, and they all report similar recidivism rates (Gottfredson and Gottfredson
1994, Greenfeld 1985, Beck and Shipley 1987). Greenfeld (1985) reports that after three
years, an offender’s risk of recidivism declines substantially and becomes extremely low
if re-arrest does not occur within five years.
There were several other important findings in the Langan and Levin (2002)
study. The authors found that prior arrest records were related to recidivism rates for
released offenders. With each additional previous arrest, the chances of recidivism
increased (Langan and Levin 2002). For example, those offenders who had one prior
arrest had a 41 percent recidivism rate within three years. Those offenders who had 15 or
more prior arrests had a recidivism rate of 82 percent within the first three years and 61
percent within the first year of release (Langan and Levin 2002).
Langan and Levin (2002) also found that offenders who were arrested at younger
ages had higher recidivism rates than those who were arrested later in life. Those who
were arrested under the age of 18 had a recidivism rate of more than 80 percent, while
those who were 45 or older when they were arrested had a recidivism rate of 43 percent.
Langan and Levin (2002) also found that race and gender were associated with
recidivism rates. African Americans had a recidivism rate of 73 percent as compared to
63 percent for whites. Women had a recidivism rate of 57 percent, while men had a
recidivism rate of 68 percent.
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Peterisilia (2003) points out that it is important to compare the Langan and
Levin’s (2002) study with the study by Beck and Shipley (1989). Beck and Shipley’s
(1989) study, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, tracked prisoners who had
served time when rehabilitation was still an important goal of prison. The expectation
would be that recidivism rates should have declined for the offenders in Langan and
Levin’s (2002) study, because they were imprisoned during a time of more severe
punishments, when the goals of deterrence and incapacitation superseded the goals of
rehabilitation in America’s prisons (Petersilia 2003). The findings for both studies are
similar; however, there are several trends that should call for concern.
Both the Langan and Levin (2002) and Beck and Shipley (1989) studies show an
overall two-thirds re-arrest rate, and that males, young people, minorities, property
criminals and those with prior arrest records have higher recidivism rates as compared to
their counterparts. Unfortunately, the recidivism rate for those offenders released in 1994
was five percent higher than the recidivism rate for those offenders released in 1983. The
recidivism rate for drug offenders increased substantially from 50 percent in the Beck and
Shipley (1989) study to 67 percent in the Langan and Levin (2002) study.
A more recent study on recidivism was published by Pew Center on the States
(2011). The recidivism rates published in this study were mainly concerned with the
prison recidivism rate. The prison recidivism rate is the “proportion of persons released
from prison who are rearrested, reconvicted or returned to custody within a specific time
period” (Pew Center on the States 2011: 7). Offenders can be returned to prison for
either being convicted of a new crime or violating the conditions of their release, such as
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failing a drug test or failing to report to their supervising officer (Pew Center on the
States 2011).
The report by Pew Center on the States (2011) is important because it allows for a
state-by-state comparison of recidivism rates. This study shows that 43.3 percent of
those released in 2004 were returned to prison within three years for either a new crime
or for violating their conditions of release. When comparing these findings with those of
the Langin and Levin (2002) study, the Pew Center on the States (2011) study reports that
when controlling for differences in survey methods and excluding the state of California,
which skewed the national data, prison recidivism rates between 1994 and 2007 have
remained around 40 percent. This number is particularly disappointing when considering
the massive increases in corrections expenditures that have taken place during this time
period.
Clearly, a large percentage of inmates re-offend upon release. Is it the individual
characteristics of offenders, the experience of being incarcerated, or society’s response to
offenders once they are released that leads them to re-offend ?
Individual Predictors of Recidivism
Gendreau et al. (1996) analyzed 131 studies to determine offender characteristics
that were linked to recidivism. The authors separated these characteristics into two
separate categories. The first category included “static factors,” or characteristics that
could not be changed. Statistically significant “static factors” included adult criminal
history, race, juvenile antisocial behavior, family rearing practices, current age,
intellectual functioning, family/parent criminality, gender, and socioeconomic status
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(Gendreau et al. 1996). The largest correlations for the static factors were for adult
criminal history (.17) and race (.17).
The second category of characteristics linked to recidivism was called “dynamic
factors” (Gendreau et al. 1996). The dynamic factors included values and behaviors that
could be changed. These were factors that could be used to design treatment programs
aimed at reducing recidivism. Dynamic factors related to recidivism were companions,
antisocial personality, social achievement, interpersonal conflict, substance abuse, and
personal distress (Gendreau et al. 1996). The largest correlations for the dynamic factors
were companions (.21) and antisocial personality (.18).
When examining all of the factors, the authors point out that the dynamic factors
are more effective at predicting recidivism than are the static factors (Gendreau et al.
1996). This finding is encouraging because it suggests that the characteristics most
associated with recidivism can be altered to possibly reduce a particular offender’s
likelihood of reoffending.
The Prison Experience and Recidivism
In a review of the research, it appears that having served time in prison may
actually increase an offender’s likelihood of re-offending upon release; however, little is
known about how the experience of being incarcerated would increase criminality.
Nagin et al. (2009) examines the relationship between serving time in prison and
recidivism. Once incarcerated, offenders often become socialized into a prison
subculture. According to Sykes (1958), the prison culture develops as inmates try to deal
with the deprivations, or “pains” of imprisonment. In other words, Sykes (1958) views
prison culture as a response to prison life. Irwin and Cressey (1962) suggest that prison
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culture is simply a reflection of the culture, values, and lifestyles that inmates bring with
them when they enter into prison. As inmates interact on a daily basis with other inmates
who value things such as violence and toughness, their commitments to a criminal
lifestyle are further developed and reinforced (Goffman 1961; Kassebaum et al. 1971;
Sykes 1958; Wheeler 1961; Akers 1998).
Another reason prison may increase likelihood of re-offending is because it does
not provide appropriate treatment for all offenders (Nagin et al. 2009; Gendreau et al.
1999; Andrews and Bonta 2006; Smith et al. 2009). Smith et al. (2009) suggests that an
offender’s risk of re-offending should be considered before choosing an appropriate
intervention. In fact, low-risk offenders will be more likely to re-offend if they are
incarcerated (Smith et al. 2009).
By arresting someone and labeling them as a criminal, quite often the result is that
person committing more crime (Hagan 1973). Criminal records linked to ex-prisoners
may limit their abilities to be productive members of society (Pager 2007). Ex-prisoners
are stigmatized by the negative reactions of police, potential employers, and significant
others (Lemert 1951; Cullen and Cullen 1978; Becker 1963). Several studies show that
employers are reluctant, and often unwilling, to hire released inmates (Pager et al. 2009;
Holzer 1996; Holzer et al. 2006). Once being labeled as a criminal, that person begins to
see himself or herself as a criminal. That person will then begin to act in a way that is
consistent with the new identity (Hagan 1973). Braithwaite (1989) further explained that
labeling through imprisonment leads to future criminality because of the resulting strain
(from limited opportunities), forced associations with other criminals, and diminished ties
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to one’s family and community. These effects will be further examined in the following
section.
Societal Causes of Recidivism
Once offenders are released from prison, many find that they are not treated as
free citizens. There are various federal and state laws that impose restrictions on
convicted felons that can inhibit successful reintegration, therefore increasing their
likelihood of re-offending (Travis 2002; Mauer 2003b). Travis (2002) describes such
restrictions as invisible punishments. These restrictions have severe consequences for
offenders, yet they operate largely out of the view of the public. According to Love and
Kuzma (1997), convicted felons may lose their rights to hold public office, serve on a
jury, or even to vote. Additional restrictions placed on convicted felons affect their
opportunities related to employment, housing, parenting, and welfare (Petersilia 2003).
Invisible punishments faced by convicted felons would not be possible without
the existence of criminal records. Criminal records, once available only to criminal
justice agencies, are now available to the public (Petersilia 2003, Mukamal and Stevens
2002, Johnson 2001). Information available to the public not only includes criminal
history, but it also includes personal information such as date of birth, picture, residence
location, height, weight, race, hair and eye color, tattoos and scars, driver’s license
number, aliases, and other personal information (Petersilia 2003).
Disseminating this information may have some public safety benefits; however, it
can also have detrimental effects on released offenders who are trying to successfully
reintegrate into society. This information can follow offenders for the rest of their lives.
Petersilia (2003) suggests a better policy would be to only disseminate information on
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offenders who commit serious crimes or on offenders who have committed crimes within
the past five years. Another suggestion would be to only report arrests that were
followed by a conviction (Petersilia 2003).
After analyzing nearly 400 studies, Lipsey (1995) reported that employment was
the single most important factor in reducing recidivism; however, according to the U.S.
Department of Labor, it is legal for employers to consider an applicant’s convictions
when making hiring decisions. Also, if an employer discovers that an employee failed to
disclose conviction information at time of application, that employee can be legally fired
from that job (Petersilia 2003).
When employers were surveyed about their likelihood to hire applicants with
criminal records, the majority reported that they would be unwilling to do so (Holzer et
al. 2002; Holzer 1996; Western et al. 2001). In fact, employers reported that they were
less likely to hire ex-offenders than members of any other disadvantaged group because
they viewed them to be unreliable and untrustworthy (Holzer et al. 2002).
There are also legal prohibitions to hiring ex-offenders in certain types of jobs.
The most common types of jobs that ban ex-offenders are in the fields of child and elder
care, education, security, law, real estate, medicine, nursing, physical therapy,
engineering, pharmacy, criminal justice, and others (Petersilia 2003). Clear and Cole
(2000) also point out that ex-offenders are often barred from receiving licenses in their
states to perform jobs that they are fully capable of doing. Several states also
permanently bar felons from being employed by county, state, or federal government
agencies (Kuzma 1998). When offenders are able to find jobs, it is estimated that they
earn 10 to 30 percent less than non-offenders working in similar jobs (Western et al.
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2001). Clearly, ex-offenders face significant barriers related to employment. This is
particularly disturbing when research shows that employment is a significant predictor of
recidivism (Lipsey 1995, Bushway and Reuter 2002, Uggen 2000).
Finding suitable housing is one of the most important, and most difficult, tasks
that ex-offenders will face upon release. According to Bradley et al. (2001:7), “Housing
is the linchpin that holds the reintegration process together.” The authors suggest that exoffenders who are unable to obtain stable living arrangements are unlikely to continue
their substance abuse or mental health treatments. Finding employment becomes even
more difficult when these offenders have no home address (Petersilia 2003).
Anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of paroled offenders in big cities are homeless
(Ripley 2002). According to Petersilia (2003), there are several reasons why such a large
proportion of released offenders are homeless. First of all, most inmates do not have the
opportunity to secure housing prior to their release. Also, those being released on parole
face additional restrictions when it comes to housing. They may be restricted from living
or even associating with those who have been involved in criminal activity (Petersilia
2003). This may include family and friends who are willing to give the offender a place
to live. Released offenders may also have a difficult time coming up with the funds
necessary to rent or purchase a home since most will not have stable employment
immediately upon release. Even if the released offender is able to amass the funds
necessary to rent a home, a background check may cause a landlord to forgo renting to
this person (Rubinstein and Mukamal 2002). If released offenders are unable to secure
housing on their own, or through family and friends, then they may attempt to find public
housing. This may also prove useless since some laws prohibit public housing for those
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convicted of felonies, especially those who are drug or sex offenders (Rubinstein and
Mukamel 2002). If ex-offenders are unable to find a suitable place to live, it is likely that
they will turn to crime to survive (Bradley et al. 2001).
Ex-offenders may also find that gaining access to financial assistance is just as
difficult as finding stable employment and housing. A provision of the welfare reform
legislation that was passed in the 1996 placed a lifetime ban on receiving financial
assistance or food stamps for those convicted of drug-related felonies (Petersilia 2003,
Allard 2002). Other provisions of the law deemed that those who violated conditions of
their probation or parole would temporarily lose access to food stamps, Social Security
Income (SSI) benefits, and public housing (Rubinstein 2001, Petersilia 2003).
The majority of offenders released from prison are not ready to immediately
return to the job market. In fact, many will need job training, education, or drug and
alcohol treatment before they are ready to hold down a steady job (Petersilia 2003). It is
during this critical time that released offenders should be able to rely on public assistance
until they are prepared to provide for themselves (Rubinstein 2001). It is also important
to note that these restrictions on public assistance not only affect ex-offenders. These
restrictions also have an adverse effect on the children and family members who depend
on the ex-offender to provide for them. Considering that released prisoners can be denied
public assistance and subsidies for housing, and that finding employment will be difficult
with a criminal record, “these vulnerable families are left with virtually no safety net”
(Petersilia 2003:126). With no way to support oneself, or one’s dependents, it is not
surprising that so many released prisoners turn to crime once again.
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The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 had several provisions that affected
prisoners as well as their families (Day 2005). It mandated states to terminate the
parental rights of those convicted of acts of violence against their children as well as
those convicted of murder and voluntary manslaughter. This legislation not only affects
the parental rights of violent offenders. Non-violent offenders can also have their
parental rights revoked if their children are in foster care for just 15 months (Petersilia
2003). In some instances, this may be in the best interest of the children of offenders;
however, one can imagine that this is not always the case. One can also imagine that a
released offender would be more likely to avoid further crime if he or she still had
parental obligations and positive relationships with children (Bales and Mears 2008).
Section Summary
After reviewing the literature on mass imprisonment, deterrence, and recidivism,
several themes become apparent. First of all, the United States has experienced an
unprecedented increase in its prison population that cannot be attributed solely to rising
crime rates. Instead, much of the rise in the incarceration rate is due to policies, such as
the “war on drugs” and mandatory and determinate sentencing, that have not only
increased the number of people who are sent to prison but also increased the amount of
time that these people will spend there. The move to such punitive policies reflected the
goals of incapacitation and deterrence. If prison sentences were perceived as certain and
severe, not only by offenders, but also by the general public, then the United States
should have experienced a bigger drop in crime rates, which would have been followed
by a decrease in the incarceration rate over time.
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The second theme that becomes apparent in the literature is that incarceration may
not equally deter criminal offenders. Generally speaking, massive increases in
incarceration rates have not been followed by massive decreases in crime rates. And,
after reviewing prison and alternative sanctions and offenders’ perceptions of them, it
becomes apparent that all offenders do not view prison as a severe punishment. These
findings call into question prison’s supposed deterrent effect.
A third theme that stands out in the literature is that many offenders return to
prison within the first three years of release. This not only causes one to question
prison’s deterrent effect, but it also leads one to question how society deals with
offenders once they are released back into the community. It seems that the “invisible
punishments” associated with being an ex-offender may increase the likelihood of
recidivism instead of deterring future criminality.
Another possible explanation for such high recidivism rates is that the experience
of being incarcerated actually increases an offender’s likelihood of re-offending upon
release. According to Nagin et al. (2009:186), “Relatively few studies seek to peer into
the ‘black box’ of imprisonment to understand why this experience might increase
crime.” It is argued here that the decision to re-offend depends on the perceived prison
experience as compared to the offender’s perceived experience in the community. If the
offender does not re-offend, then he or she is free to remain in society; however, if the
offender does decide to commit another crime upon release, then that offender will more
than likely be returned to prison and cut off from the rest of the world for a period of
time. Because of this, prison can be viewed as its own society, and when looking at
conventional society and prison society, it becomes possible to apply stratification
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concepts to understand how offenders would live both experiences. In talking about
societies, the concepts of economic, cultural, and social capital could explain variation in
the likelihood of re-offending by inmates.
Prison Societies
There has been much work devoted to the study of prison systems and inmate
populations (La Vigne and Samuels 2012; Steele and Jacobs 1975; Lab et al. 2004;
Dilulio 1987; Johnson and Wolfe 2003; Ehrlich 1974; Becker 1968). Researchers have
looked at prisons to discover if they successfully deter crime, rehabilitate offenders, or
punish criminals for the crimes they have committed (Craig 2004; Haney 2008; Feeley
and Simon 1992). Research has also examined if the experience of prison may have a
criminogenic effect on offenders (May and Wood 2010; Nagin et al. 2009; Goffman
1961; Kassebaum et al. 1971; Sykes 1958; Wheeler 1961; Akers 1998; Smith et al.
2009). There have been numerous research objectives aimed at empirically measuring
conditions associated with prisons, but through an extensive review of prison literature, it
seems that an analysis of the formation of prison “classes” is not appropriately attended.
When an offender enters into prison, he is essentially leaving one society and
entering a new one with its own territory, authority, and expectations. According to
Sykes (1958), when an offender enters a prison, he is stripped of traditional status
symbols, and a new hierarchy exists with different symbols coming into play.
A review of the literature consistently found authors describing prison societies.
Sykes (1954) refers to prison as a “society of captives.” Prison has also been referred to
as a “kingdom of inmates” (Hassine 2004:43), a “political society of its own” (Johnson
and Toch 2000:160), a “lawless society” (Hassine 2004:45), and a “city within a city”
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(Johnson and Toch 2000:165). If prison is its own unique society, we should be able to
apply stratification concepts to determine who fares best in that particular society.
There are many ethnographic works describing life inside of prison (Irwin 1987;
Santos 2007; Pisano 2012; Mitchell 2009; Ross 2002; Trammell 2011; Johnson and Toch
2000; Hassine 2004; Sykes 1954). It becomes apparent that the things seen as important
in society at large may not be the same as the things seen as important in a prison society.
While such notions can be drawn out of the literature, there has been no direct attempt at
applying class theory to prison populations. Published works have given us a glimpse
into prison walls, and they have let us into the minds of inmates and personnel, but what
is lacking is an understanding of the social structure within prisons and an understanding
of what characteristics are most important in that structure. If we can understand the
prison social structure as compared to the outside world and what characteristics give an
offender the best opportunities in both structures, we may better understand an offender’s
likelihood of re-offending upon release.
Social stratification refers to the institutionalized power arrangements that
perpetuate inequality among groups of people (Pease et al. 1970). It is not the purpose of
this research to rehash stratification concepts, nor is it the purpose to say that one
stratification theory is superior to another. It does mean to argue that such concepts could
prove useful in explaining offenders’ likelihood of re-offending upon release as
compared to explanations offered by deterrence theory. To illustrate the argument,
concepts from Pierre Bourdieu will be used.
Pierre Bourdieu was chosen for this task for several reasons. First, Bourdieu
(1986) goes beyond our traditional conceptions of capital, or material assets, and argues
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that cultural, social, and symbolic capital play an important role in where one ranks in the
social hierarchy (Navarro 2006). Second, Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of habitus, or
socialized ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, reproduces class structure (Wacquant
2005). Last, his concept of social fields, or the various social arenas where people
compete for different forms of capital, allows us to compare an offender’s social position
in conventional society to his social position in prison (Bourdieu 1985; Gaventa 2003).
Pierre Bourdieu
According to Bourdieu (1985), all human actions occur in social fields. He
acknowledges that to really understand human action, one has to consider the context in
which that action takes place (Bourdieu 1985). It is also important to note that a person’s
location within a certain field subjects that person to certain conditions of existence. As
people internalize those conditions and begin to think, feel, and act in patterned ways, it
is likely that others occupying that same position within a certain field will think, feel,
and act in similar ways (Bourdieu 1985).
Bourdieu (1990) refers to these patterned ways of thinking, feeling, and acting as
constituting habitus. Brubaker (1985) defines habitus as a system of internalized
dispositions that mediates between structure and action. Habitus can be viewed as
structure and agency at the same time (Brubaker 1985; Reay 2004). People are conscious
of their actions, but they do not rationally lay out their choices. Through patterned
behavior, class structure is reproduced. In other words, people who share similar ways of
thinking, feeling, and acting, have similar lifestyles. Those with similar lifestyles begin
to see themselves as distinct from other groups who think, feel, and act differently from
them (Bourdieu 1984). In this way, class structure is produced.
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Volume and composition of capital are important concepts for Bourdieu (1984,
1985, 1986). Bourdieu argues that there are three main forms of capital. Economic
capital is that “which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be
institutionalized in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1986: 47).
Cultural capital is also important for Bourdieu; however, the definition of cultural
capital has suffered from some ambiguity (Lamont and Lareau 1988). Bourdieu
(1986:47) specifically defines cultural capital as that “which is convertible, on certain
conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational
qualifications.” Much of Bourdieu’s work focused on cultural capital, and in these
works, he refers to cultural capital as such things as family background, educational
credentials, and artistic abilities and appreciations (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986;
Bourdieu 1973). For Bourdieu, cultural capital was different from human capital in that
cultural capital was a by-product of socialization, not necessarily something acquired
through individual investment (Dimaggio 2001).
The third form of capital important for Bourdieu is social capital. Bourdieu
defines social capital as “social connections which may be institutionalized as titles of
nobility” (1986: 47). Social capital refers to one’s access to networks of influence and
support, and also access to their volume and composition of capital (Bourdieu 1986).
Symbolic capital is also mentioned. One has symbolic capital when his or her other
forms of capital are seen as legitimate (Bourdieu 1986). According to Bourdieu
(1985:196), “The kinds of capital, like aces in a game of cards, are powers which define
the chances of profit in a given field.”
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Different forms of capital have different values depending on the field of
interaction (Bourdieu 1985; 1986). Individuals and institutions become distinguished
from one another by acquiring capital that is useful in that field (Bourdieu 1985). In
essence, social fields become arenas for the struggle of resources, and actors are
positioned within those fields according to the volume and composition of capital
available to them (Bourdieu 1985). In social fields of interaction, dominant and
subordinate groups strategically struggle for power. They use their different forms of
capital to maximize their potential within that field (Bourdieu 1985).
As mentioned earlier, it is the purpose of this research to show that stratification
concepts could prove useful in explaining offenders’ likelihood of re-offending upon
release. It will be important to examine how inmates determine their place in the prison
structure as well as in conventional society. To understand who fares best in each
society, it is important to understand Bourdieu’s conception of what constitutes a class.
A class is the product of differing conditions of existence, differing systems of
dispositions, and differential endowments of power and capital (Brubaker 1985, Bourdieu
1984). People who share similar conditions of existence and who share a common
habitus will be members of the same class (Bourdieu 1985). It is important to mention
that one’s class membership can vary according to the field of interaction.
According to Brubaker (1985: 767), “Age, sex, and ethnicity are not principles of
division that cross-cut class division: they constitute class divisions (more precisely they
are indicators of class-constitutive differences in conditions of existence and
dispositions).” This will be very important in analyzing an offenders potential within a
prison social structure as well as within conventional society.
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Bourdieu’s ideas have been used in a wide range of disciplines and empirically
tested on a wide range of topics (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007). More recently, Bourdieu’s
concepts have been used to examine topics such as the family (Lareau 2003), ethnicity
(Brubaker 2004), education (Carter 2005), the media (Benson and Neveu 2005), and
gender (Lizardo 2006; Fodor 2003; Martin 2005; Adkins and Skeggs 2004). In
discussing methodological concerns for empirical studies of prison, Schlosser (2013:33)
encourages researchers to consider the concepts of Pierre Bourdieu, along with Michel
Foucault, as “guides to understanding those social processes of prison life that we cannot
readily see.” After reviewing empirical literature testing Bourdieu’s concepts, it appears
that an application of his concepts to the study of prisons and recidivism is lacking. This
research will address this gap in the literature.
Bourdieu and Prison Societies
It is possible to look within the walls of a prison and compare the social structure
in a prison system with that on the outside. Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capital, and
habitus can be used to better understand the position of offenders within a prison as well
as in conventional society.
Social Field
Because fields are structured spaces of positions in which all human actions
occur, a prison, just as conventional society, could be designated as a social field. Within
different fields, different forms of capital have different values (Bourdieu 1985).
Because prison can be viewed as a field of interaction, with its own set of rules, it is
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possible to uncover the objective conditions of existence and the subjective dispositions
stemming from those conditions that would place people within each particular society.
Because different forms of capital have different values depending on the field of
interaction, a discussion of the different forms of capital and their power in maximizing
an offender’s potential in the community and within the prison walls could prove useful.
Economic Capital
In conventional society, economic capital would refer to things such as money
and property (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 1986). In prison, goods and services make up the
majority of economic capital (Gleason 1978; Hassine 2004). Gleason (1978) suggests
that normal economic forces operate inside of prison and many of the “hustle” activities
within prison are similar versions of the illegal and legal activities that take place on the
outside. The prison black-market system makes sure that an inmate’s basic needs are met
(Hassine 2004; Gleason 1978). In prison, there seems to be “a stable class of merchants
and consumers” (Hassine 2004:50). The prisoners, who provide the goods and services
to other inmates, have a steady flow of income (Gleason 1978). Not only are their
services needed, but they are also demanded (Hassine 2004). Because of their very
important role in the underground prison economy, the economic capital of “swag” men,
or prison “hustlers” has a good deal of value in a prison system (Gleason 1978; Hassine
2004).
It is important to note that those who have money and property on the outside
usually fare better in conventional society. In prison, economic capital takes different
forms and offers potential to those who may have ranked low in economic capital on the
outside. Because the “hustle” activities in prison resemble those that take place in illegal
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markets on the outside, those inmates who bring those skills with them into prison may
perform well in the underground prison economy (Gleason 1978). An examination of
poverty rates in the United States shows that in general, whites are more economically
advantaged than are African Americans (McCartney et al. 2013). In general, whites have
more economic capital outside of prison; however, African Americans may be able to
acquire more economic capital within prison, as compared to whites. Crouch (1993)
noted that the underclass environment from which many African American prisoners
come makes them better suited for the deprivations associated with prison. Also, due to
the large proportion of African American men who are incarcerated, it is more likely that
these men will find friends or relatives who can provide access to material goods while in
prison.
Cultural Capital
In conventional society, cultural capital refers to such things as educational
credentials, family background, particular tastes, language, and artistic abilities (Bourdieu
1984; Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 1986). On the outside, cultural capital is seen as
stemming from family to children (Bourdieu 1986). In prison, cultural capital may stem
from more experienced inmates to the newcomers; therefore, prison experience can be
envisioned as a form of cultural capital. In talking about their prison experiences, many
inmates refer to the advice that older inmates gave them (Johnson and Toch 2000). They
admit that prison life is unlike anything an average citizen has ever experienced, and
because of this, a new prisoner needs advice if he is to survive on the inside.
Prisons have their own sets of rules, and inmates who abide by these rules have
the best chance of surviving on the inside. The convict code refers to the rules that
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prisoners should abide by in order to survive on the inside (Clemmer 1940; Irwin 1985;
Sykes and Messinger 1960; Toch 1992; Johnson and Toch 2000; Santos 2004; Einat and
Einat 2000). The convict code makes up the majority of norms and values of inmate
subculture, and it provides inmates with an informal means to gain power and status in
prison (Einat and Einat 2000). Familiarity with prison language, “jargon,” or “argot,” is
indicative of an inmate’s status and experience within prison (Hebdige 1985; Einat and
Einat 2000). Those with experience in prison have high prison cultural capital, not only
because they can give advice, but also because of their understanding of the convict code
of conduct. Because of their need for advice and lack of understanding of this code, new
inmates are low in prison cultural capital; however, those who have previously served a
prison sentence may rank higher in prison cultural capital when coming into the
institution.
In prison, one’s crime success stories hold as much weight as one’s job success
stories hold on the outside. Once committed to prison, it is not your educational
credentials or legitimate careers that matter. It matters how good you were at doing
crime (Santos 2004). In the words of an inmate, “When a man commits to the subculture
of prison, definitions of honor, respect, integrity, and character take on entirely new
meanings that are completely at odds with the world of noncriminals” (Santos 2004:100).
Those who have mastered the art of deception and who have eluded the attention of law
enforcement may rank high in prison cultural capital. At the same time, those who did
not have successful criminal careers and who lack the ability to successfully commit
crime may rank low in prison cultural capital. It could be said that the inmates are either
skilled or unskilled in committing crime. This affects an inmate’s cultural capital.
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Social Capital
In conventional society, social capital is seen as such things as access to social
networks and support (Bourdieu 1986). Having a close family and “friends in high
places” would constitute social capital on the outside; however, once in prison, close
family members and friends cannot help the offender if they do not have contacts on the
inside. In prison, social capital refers to the same types of things, but it may be an even
more important form of capital to possess when in prison. Having access to social
networks can provide security, favor, money, and goods and services (Crouch 1993;
Wood and May 2003). This could explain why African Americans adjust better to
prison. African Americans appear to adjust better to prison than do whites because they
often find friends and relatives who are already in that prison (Crouch 1993; Wood and
May 2003). These friends and relatives can provide the new inmate with information,
goods and services, and protection (Crouch 1993; Wood and May 2003). With this in
mind, it appears that African Americans would rank higher in social capital when they go
to prison. This social capital can help to reduce anxiety in many ways (Johnson and Toch
2004). These inmates know what to expect when going in, they will already know
someone once on the inside, they will not be as vulnerable to attacks because they will
have someone to vouch for their reputation, and they will adjust better to the prison
society overall as compared to those lacking prison social capital (Johnson and Toch
2004).
Santos (2004) says that the leaders of large criminal organizations and gangs,
regardless of race, are at the top of the social hierarchy in prisons. Because of their
access to social networks, they are able to stay to themselves and have everything taken
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care of for them. These people also have access to networks that can help them smuggle
in drugs and other goods that are in severe demand in the prison, further securing their
stake at the top of the prison hierarchy (Fleisher and Decker 2001; Macko 1997).
Through their networks, they may be able to provide security for people not only on the
inside, but also on the outside. In addition, people with high social capital may have
access to networks, such as legal counsel or high ranking officials that can arrange for
additional benefits for them inside of the prison.
Ultimately, those with the most social capital in prison rank high in economic and
cultural capital, because having access to networks gives one access to goods and
services, protection, knowledge, and skills, among other things (Camp and Camp 1985;
Macko 1997). In conventional society, those ranking high in economic capital will
ultimately rank high in cultural and social capital because according to Bourdieu (1986),
economic capital is at the root of cultural and social capital.
Once a person becomes known for ranking high in the different forms of capital,
that person is endowed with symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 1986).
Symbolic capital refers to things such as prestige and reputation (Bourdieu 1985). Since
symbolic capital only exists when others recognize the legitimacy of the other forms of
capital, those with symbolic capital are endowed with power (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu
1986). Those endowed with power, or those with the most symbolic capital, are at the
top of the social hierarchy in prison.
Habitus
Bourdieu (1985) sees similar objective conditions of existence and subjective
dispositions, or habitus, as constituting a class. In other words, by understanding certain
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conditions and dispositions of offenders, they can be placed in the social structure, not
only on the outside, but also within a prison. An important element of this research is
discovering things that are important in the social hierarchy within a prison. In other
words, what conditions of existence will provide the offender with the best potential
within a prison? According to Hassine (2004), race becomes the most obvious condition
that provides potential; however, other conditions of existence that are relevant to
potential within a prison field are such things as gang affiliation, geographic origin,
prison occupation, sexual preference, and religious preference (Hassine 2004).
First, race will be discussed as an objective condition of existence capable of
producing habitus. When an inmate is stripped of everything when he enters a prison, his
race is his most distinguishable feature. Skin color is the most obvious factor in group
identity. It is almost understood that an inmate should stick with his own race once he
enters prison (Danitz 1998; Koehler 2000; Kauffman 1999; Hassine 2004). To discourage
organizations from forming that can threaten a prison’s security, it appears that the
prisons profit from encouraging racial polarization (Hassine 2004). As long as the
different racial groups are against each other, they are not banding together against
security officers. When looking at power dynamics in prison, as well as in society at
large, it is obvious that race plays a factor; however, it appears that African Americans
may fare better in prison than whites as compared to being on the outside because they
are more likely to find friends and relatives in prison who can provide them with access
to the various forms of capital.
According to Bourdieu (1985), a person’s class position is the same as another
person’s class position if they share similar objective conditions of existence, and these
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shared conditions of existence, such as race, geographic location, and ethnicity, generate
a habitus that is particular to those groups. Because different inmates will share different
conditions of existence, and therefore different habitus, it is safe to assume that some will
fare better in prison than others. By understanding the effects of economic, cultural, and
social capital, as well as habitus, within conventional society, and within the prison field,
one can better understand why some offenders self-report a likelihood of re-offending
upon release, even when knowing that doing so could land them back in prison.
Unfortunately, some offenders may see themselves as having better opportunities and
experiences within a prison setting than in conventional society. If this is the case, then
one cannot assume that all offenders will be equally deterred from re-offending upon
release.
Summary
Much insight stands to be gained about likelihood of re-offending by applying
elements of stratification theory to offender populations. This could also prove useful in
understanding the utility, or lack thereof, of deterrence theory in explaining or predicting
likelihood of re-offending for criminal offenders.
It is the purpose of this research to examine factors that may underlie an
offender’s likelihood of re-offending upon release from prison. If one can understand
how an inmate’s volume and composition of capital in the community, as compared to
his volume and composition of capital in prison, affect his or her experience within those
respective societies, then one can better understand an inmate’s likelihood of re-offending
upon release.
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This theory is unique to the study of recidivism because it compares offender
experiences and opportunities within prison to their experiences and opportunities in the
community. This framework may explain why prison does not deter all offenders equally
and why prior punishment may actually increase an offender’s likelihood of re-offending
in the future. Serving time in prison may increase an offender’s volume and composition
of prison capital while simultaneously decreasing community capital; therefore, the
deterrent potential of prison associated with recidivism may be reduced for offender
populations.
It is the purpose of the following chapters to statistically illustrate how the various
forms of capital may explain the inability of incarceration to deter offenders equally. In
addition, this research will illustrate how the prison experience may actually increase
likelihood of re-offending by increasing prison capital, while simultaneously decreasing
community capital.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES

A review of the literature suggests that both deterrence and stratification concepts
may prove useful in explaining offending; however, their relative impacts are unknown.
It is possible that stratification concepts proposed in the capital model will explain more
variance in inmates’ self-reported likelihood of re-offending than will concepts offered
by the deterrence model. To test this assumption, this research will examine the effects
of prior punishment and perceived certainty and severity of prison sanctions on inmates’
self-reported likelihood of re-offending. This research will also examine the relative
effects of inmates’ capital, in the community as well as in prison, on self-reported
likelihood of re-offending upon release.
Specific Deterrence Model
Several important elements can be drawn out of the deterrence literature to
explain offending. Those who perceive punishment to be certain and severe should be
less likely to offend. Also, those who have experienced prior punishment for criminal
activity should be less likely to re-offend because receiving punishment should increase
one’s perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment. Those who do not perceive
punishment for criminal activity to be certain and severe and those who have not been
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punished for criminal activity should be more likely to re-offend. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the relationship between deterrence concepts and likelihood of re-offending.
Comparable Capital Model
What constitutes the different forms of capital will differ depending on the field
of interaction. When making the assumption that those having high compositions of
community capital will have less opportunity to obtain high compositions of prison
capital, and that those having low compositions of community capital will have better
opportunities at obtaining capital in prison societies, one can envision a reversal of the
social hierarchy when going from the outside community to a prison society. Offenders
will be more likely to choose a society where they can maximize their volume and
composition of existing capital. This proposed relationship is explained in Figure 3.2.
The Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending helps explain why some inmates are
more likely to re-offend than are others. The proposed relationship shows that those
ranking high in community capital will be less likely to re-offend upon release, and those
ranking high in prison capital will be more likely to re-offend upon release.
Hypotheses
To assess the influence of specific deterrence indicators, as well as community
and prison capital indicators, on inmates’ likelihood of re-offending upon release, several
hypotheses will be tested. The first four hypotheses are derived from the ideas of
traditional deterrence, though not consistently supported by the literature. Hypothesis 5
and Hypothesis 6 are based on ideas drawn out of the recidivism literature and will be
used to test the proposed Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending.
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Hypothesis 1: Inmates with higher levels of perceived certainty of
punishment will be less likely to re-offend upon release.



Hypothesis 2: Inmates with longer sentences will be less likely to reoffend upon release.



Hypothesis 3: Inmates with higher levels of perceived severity of
punishment will be less likely to re-offend upon release.



Hypothesis 4: Inmates who have received prior punishment will be less
likely to re-offend upon release.



Hypothesis 5 : Inmates with higher levels of community capital will be
less likely to re-offend upon release.



Hypothesis 6: Inmates with higher levels of prison capital will be more
likely to re-offend upon release.

The next chapter will discuss specifics of the research, including the population to
be studied and the research method.
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Figure 3.1

Illustration of the Specific Deterrence Model
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Figure 3.2

Illustration of Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending

62

CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODS
Research hypotheses will be tested using data collected at the Central Mississippi
Correctional Facility, the central assessment and reception facility in the state of
Mississippi. The prison population in Mississippi has quadrupled over the last 30 years,
and the state of Mississippi has the second highest incarceration rate in the United States,
second only to Louisiana (Pew Charitable Trusts 2014). With such a high proportion of
its citizens affected by incarceration, Mississippi is an ideal location to conduct research
examining the effects of prison life on likelihood of re-offending.
Population of Study
The state of Mississippi has three state prisons: Central Mississippi Correctional
Facility, Mississippi State Penitentiary, and South Mississippi Correctional Institution.
All offenders who are sentenced to the Mississippi Department of Corrections are first
taken to the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility for processing and classification.
Once they have been screened for medical conditions, given psychiatric evaluations,
assessed regarding their education level, and monitored for institutional behavior, inmates
are designated a custody status and assigned to a state institution (Mississippi Department
of Corrections 2014).
Of the three state prisons, Central Mississippi Correctional Facility is the only one
to house both male and female inmates of minimum, medium, and maximum security
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classifications. It was the intention of this research to survey both male and female
inmates, first time as well as repeat offenders, violent, drug, and property offenders, and
different levels of security offenders. Of the three state prisons, Central Mississippi
Correctional Facility offered the best opportunity to survey the widest variety of inmates.
Survey Instrument
After reviewing the literature and considering findings from a previous survey
conducted at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in 2002, researchers designed a
nine-page, self-report survey that would measure numerous aspects of inmates’ lives,
both in the community and in prison. In particular, the survey was designed to measure
inmates’ compositions of economic, cultural, and social capital both in the community
and in prison.
To measure compositions of economic capital in the community, inmates were
asked several questions regarding employment, income from both legal and illegal
sources, home ownership, likelihood of being able to support oneself upon release,
turning to crime to make ends meet, and ease of obtaining goods in the community as
compared to prison. To measure economic capital in prison, inmates were asked about
the prison economy and how they go about obtaining goods and services in prison and
whether obtaining goods and services in prison is easier than obtaining goods and
services in the community.
To measure cultural capital in the community, inmates were asked several
questions regarding family’s social class, education of both mother and father, inmate’s
level of education, what kind of grades inmate made when in school, special talents,
reputation, and how well one will adjust to life in the community upon release. To
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measure cultural capital in prison, inmates were asked questions regarding respect,
power, and status in prison, family members who have been incarcerated, how much one
has in common with other inmates, how well one has adjusted to prison life, and how
well an inmate understands prison life.
To measure social capital in the community, inmates were asked questions
regarding support from family and friends upon release, connections to powerful people
in the community, marital status, relationship with children, and how often one
communicates with family members or friends who are not incarcerated. To measure
social capital in prison, inmates were asked questions regarding their connections to
powerful people inside of prison, and their relationships with other inmates and
correctional staff.
Inmates’ were also asked about their perceptions of the certainty and severity of
prison sanctions, and about their likelihoods of re-offending upon release from this
facility. The survey instrument used to collect data for this study is included in the
Appendix.
Data Collection
After coordinating with Mississippi Department of Corrections administrators and
receiving IRB approval, members of the research team went to the Central Mississippi
Correctional Facility on two separate occasions in 2011 and 2012. Researchers were
allowed access to several units in Area I. Area I houses the reception and classification
unit, some men’s and all women’s housing units, medical facilities, as well as
educational, vocational, drug and alcohol, and work program facilities.
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Upon arrival in each particular unit, correctional officers would announce the
presence of the research team and solicit the attention of the inmates. Research team
members would then give a brief statement about the survey. Inmates were told that their
participation was completely voluntary, and due to Mississippi Department of
Corrections policy, no incentives could be given for participation. They were informed
of the purpose of the study, their rights, and how their privacy would be protected. They
were also informed that they could withdraw their consent and discontinue participation
at any time. After this brief statement about the study, respondents were asked if they
wanted to participate. The ones who expressed a desire to participate in the study were
given an informed consent document that outlined the name and purpose of the research,
the approximate duration of the study, potential benefits, risks, inconveniences, and
discomforts associated with the study, information about participants’ rights and privacy,
and reassurance that their participation was completely voluntary. After reading and
signing the informed consent document, participants were given a survey. Members of
the research team remained in the room to answer any questions, as well as to ensure that
no contact occurred between prison personnel and respondents during their participation
in the survey. The survey took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete.
Sample Description
According to the Mississippi Department of Corrections (2014), the Central
Mississippi Correctional Facility held 3,031 total inmates when this research was
conducted. Fifty-seven percent of the inmates were classified as African American,
Forty-two percent of the inmates were classified as white, and one percent was classified
66

as “other.” Sixty-nine percent of the inmates were male and thirty-one percent were
female.
Even though research team members did not have access to all inmates at the
facility, and the sampling procedure was based on convenience, the final sample of
respondents was fairly representative of the inmates housed at Central Mississippi
Correctional Facility at the time the study was conducted. There were 456 completed
surveys. Of the respondents, fifty-one percent were male, forty-nine percent were
female, forty-eight percent were African American, forty-nine percent were white, and
three percent were classified as “other.” Thirty percent of respondents were incarcerated
for a violent offense. Twenty percent were incarcerated for a property offense, and
thirty-three percent were incarcerated for a drug-related offense. Seventeen percent of
the respondents were incarcerated for other reasons, including parole violations. Of the
respondents, forty-three percent were minimum security inmates, fifty-four percent were
medium security inmates, and three percent were maximum security inmates. Thirty-five
percent of respondents were first-time offenders, and sixty-five percent were repeat
offenders.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this research was self-reported likelihood of reoffending upon release. Inmates were asked the following question: “Imagine someone
like yourself will be released next week. Using the number line below, please circle the
likelihood that within three years that person will commit another crime.” Respondents
could circle from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely). This question was adapted from
a previous survey administered at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility by Dr. Peter
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B. Wood and Dr. Terri Ernest. The wording of the question allows for inmates to report
their own likelihood of re-offending while protecting them from any suspected reprisals
from criminal justice authorities. This indirect method of measuring self-reported
likelihood has been used and endorsed in previous research (Wood 2007; Grasmick and
Bursik 1990; Klepper and Nagin 1989; Bouffard 2002).
This study considered those who reported “0” as having no likelihood of reoffending upon release and those who reported anything other than “0” as having at least
some likelihood of re-offending upon release. Instead of using the dependent variable as
a continuous variable appropriate for OLS regression, it was used as a dichotomized
variable appropriate for logistic regression. This decision was made because,
conceptually, any self-reported likelihood of re-offending upon release marks a failure of
our correctional system to effectively deter future criminal behavior. Description for the
dependent variable is found in Table 4.1.
Independent Variables for the Specific Deterrence Model
To examine factors that affect the likelihood of re-offending, a specific deterrence
model was tested, using variables measuring inmates’ perceived certainty and severity of
punishment, length of current sentence, as well as inmates’ prior punishment (a measure
of specific deterrence). Next, each of these indicators will be discussed.

Certainty
To measure an inmate’s perceived certainty of being rearrested upon re-offending,
respondents were asked: “If you commit another crime after you are released, what is the
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likelihood that you will be arrested for committing that crime?” Response categories
ranged from 0 “Not at all Likely” to 10 “Very Likely.” This measure was also used as an
indicator of certainty by Wood (2007). Those who reported higher levels of certainty of
re-arrest should be less likely to re-offend upon release.
Severity
To measure an inmate’s perceived severity of prison sanctions, respondents were
asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “Being incarcerated is a severe
sentence.” Possible responses were 1 “Strongly Disagree,” 2 “Disagree,” 3 “Agree,” and
4 “Strongly Agree.” Those expressing higher levels of agreement that prison is a severe
sentence should be less likely to re-offend upon release.
The length of an inmate’s current sentence was also used as a measure of severity
of punishment. Inmates were asked, “How long is your current sentence?” This measure
was previously used as an indicator of sanction severity by Wood (2007). Due to the
severity of the punishment, inmates with longer sentences should be less likely to reoffend.
Prior Punishment
Those who have received prior punishment should be less likely to re-offend. To
measure an inmate’s prior punishment, respondents were asked: “Before now, had you
ever spent time in an adult correctional facility, work center, or jail?” Possible responses
were “yes” and “no.” Wood (2007) also used this measure as an indicator of prior
punishment. This variable was dummy coded so that “1” represents those who have
spent time in adult facilities and “0” represents those who have not. According to
69

deterrence theory, those who have received prior punishment should be less likely to reoffend upon release. Variable descriptions for the specific deterrence model are given in
Table 4.2.
Independent Variables for the Comparable Capital Model
To test the proposed Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending, the effects of
both community capital and prison capital indicators on the likelihood of re-offending
were examined. Next, the specific indicators representing inmates’ community and
prison capital will be discussed.
Community Capital
To measure an inmate’s capital in the community, respondents were asked to selfreport their social class. Inmates were asked, “How would you describe your social class
before you were incarcerated?” Possible responses were 1 “lower class,” 2 “lower
middle class,” 3 “middle class,” 4 “upper middle class,” and 5 “upper class.” Those
ranking higher in social class should be less likely to re-offend upon release.
Respondents’ highest level of education was also used as an indicator of
community cultural capital. Inmates were asked, “What is your highest level of
education?” Responses ranged from 1 “8th grade or less,” 2 “some high school,” 3 “high
school diploma or GED,” 4 “some college,” 5 “completed college,” and 6 “graduate or
professional degree.” Inmates with higher levels of education should be less likely to reoffend upon release.
Whether inmates believed that going to prison was expected of them before
incarceration was used as a measure of cultural capital in the community. Respondents
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were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “Before incarceration, I
felt that going to prison was expected of me.” Possible responses ranged from 1
“Strongly Agree,” 2 “Agree,” 3 “Disagree,” and 4 “Strongly Disagree.” Higher values
represent more cultural capital in the community, and those with more cultural capital in
the community should be less likely to re-offend upon release.
Respondents’ employment status prior to incarceration was also used as an
indicator of economic capital in the community. Inmates were asked, “Which of the
following best describes your employment status just before incarceration?” Responses
were coded as 1 “working full time” and 0 “not working full time.” Inmates who report
having full time employment prior to incarceration should be less likely to re-offend upon
release.
Whether inmates believed that obtaining goods and services in the community is
easier than obtaining goods and services in prison was used as an indicator of economic
capital in the community. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the
following statement: “It was easier to obtain goods and services in the community than it
is in prison.” Possible responses ranged from 1 “Strongly Disagree,” 2 “Disagree,” 3
“Agree,” and 4 “Strongly Agree.” Higher values represent more economic capital in the
community, and those with high economic capital in the community should be less likely
to re-offend upon release.
Several other indicators were used to compute an index variable representing
social capital in the community. Inmates were asked to agree or disagree with the
following statements: “Right before incarceration, I could depend on my family for
help,” “Right before incarceration, I could depend on my friends for help,” “When I am
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released from prison, I will be able to depend on my family for help,” and “When I am
released from prison, I will be able to depend on my friends for help.” Responses for
community social capital indicators ranged from 1=“Strongly Disagree,” 2 “Disagree,” 3
“Agree,” and 4 “Strongly Agree.” The responses on these items were averaged to create
an index variable representing community social capital. Those with higher index scores
should be less likely to re-offend upon release. A description of the community social
capital index variable, along with missing values and mean replacement information for
the various indicators used to compute this index, are listed in Table 4.3.
Prison Capital
To measure an inmate’s capital in prison, respondents were asked to agree or
disagree to the following statements: “All things considered, life in prison can be easier
than life on the outside,” “I have gained more respect in prison than I did in the
community,” “I understand prison life better than I understand life on the outside,” “I
have more power in prison than I do in the community,” “I have more in common with
people in prison than I do with people in the community,” and “I have adjusted well to
prison life.” Responses ranged from 1 “Strongly Disagree,” 2 “Disagree,” 3 “Agree,” and
4 “Strongly Agree.” Inmates’ responses to these statements were averaged to create an
index representing prison experience capital. Inmates with higher index scores for prison
experience capital should be less likely to re-offend upon release. A description of the
prison experience capital indicator, along with missing values and mean replacement for
the various indicators used to compute this variable, is given in Table 4.4.
An inmate’s relationship with prison staff could also serve as an indicator of
prison capital. Inmates were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: “I
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basically get along with correctional staff,” “Most correctional staff look out for me,” “If
I were threatened or hurt by another inmate, I would report it to correctional staff,” “If I
knew someone well in prison who was threatened or hurt by another inmate, I would
report it to correctional staff,” “If I didn’t know someone that well who was threatened or
hurt by another inmate, I would report it to correctional staff,” and “If I were threatened
or hurt by another inmate, my friends would report it to correctional staff.” Responses to
these items ranged from 1 “Strongly Disagree,” 2 “Disagree,” 3 “Agree,” and 4 “Strongly
Agree.” Inmates’ responses to these items were averaged to create an index variable
representing their relationships with prison staff. Inmates who report better relationships
with prison staff should have a better prison experience; therefore, they should be more
likely to re-offend upon release. A description of the prison staff index variable, along
with missing values and mean replacement information for the various indicators used to
compute this variable, is given in Table 4.4.
Descriptions for all of the independent variables in the maximum capital model
are given in Table 4.2.
Control Variables
When performing logistic regression, several control variables were included in
the analysis. Respondents’ gender was dummy coded as 1 “male” and 0 “female.” Race
was also used as a statistical control. To measure race, respondents were asked: “How do
you describe yourself?” Responses included 1 “Black/African American,” 2 “White,” 3
“American Indian,” 4 “Asian,” 5 “Hispanic,” and 6 “Other.” For purposes of this study,
respondents’ race was dummy coded as 1 “Black/African American” and 0 “Other.”
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Respondents’ age was also used as a statistical control. Age was not specifically given,
so a new age variable was computed as (year of study - year born).
Several other control variables, including marital status and type of crime
committed, were included in the analysis. To measure marital status, inmates were
asked, “What was your marital status just before incarceration?” Possible responses were
1 “single, never married,” 2 “married,” 3 “separated,” 4 “divorced,” 5 “widow/widower,”
and 6 “in a committed relationship but not married.” Responses were dummy coded as 1
“married” and 0 “not married.”
The type of crime for which an inmate is currently incarcerated was also used as a
statistical control. Inmates were asked, “For what crime types are you currently
incarcerated?” Possible responses were 1 “Violent Crime,” 2 “Property Crime,” 3 “Drug
Crime,” and 4 “Other.” These responses were dummy coded for each of the crime types.
Violent criminals were coded as 1 “yes,” 0 “no.” Property criminals were coded as 1
“yes” and 0 “no.” Drug criminals were coded as 1 “yes” and 0 “no.” Criminals
incarcerated for parole violations and “other” crimes were coded as 1 “yes” and 0 “no.”
Descriptions for all control variables are given in Table 4.1
Missing Values
For purposes of this study, cases with missing information for the dependent
variable were not included in the analysis. Twenty cases were lost due to this decision.
To preserve as many other cases as possible, missing values were replaced with the mean
response for each independent variable. Mean replacement, or mean imputation, is useful
for saving cases, and it does not change the overall mean for the particular variables;
however, mean imputation can distort variable distributions (Little and Rubin 2002). To
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check for inaccuracies, logistic regression models were run both with and without mean
imputation. Results for both methods were similar, and significant findings remained
constant irrespective of method. For purposes of this research, findings from the imputed
models will be reported and discussed. Information on missing values and mean
replacement is given in Table 4.5.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics were run for all control, independent, and dependent
variables in the study. The descriptive statistics for all control variables will be discussed
next. Means and standard deviations are given in Table 4.6.
Control Variables
The final sample of respondents included 217 females and 219 males. African
Americans comprised the majority of the population at the facility when research was
conducted (57 percent), and the final sample contained 46.8 percent African American
respondents. Whites made up approximately 42 percent of the inmate population at this
facility when research was conducted, and they comprised 50 percent of the final sample.
There were also six Hispanics, four American Indians, two Asians, and two listed as
“Other” in the final sample. These categories made up 3.2 percent of the final sample
and were collapsed into the “Other” category along with Whites. Thus, Blacks compared
to non-Blacks. The age of respondents when research was conducted ranged from 19 to
68. The mean age of respondents was 37 years.
Marital status and crime type will also be used as statistical controls. Of the final
sample, 20.2 percent were married prior to incarceration, and 79.8 percent were not
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married. Also, approximately 30 percent of the final sample respondents were violent
offenders, 20 percent were property offenders, 34 percent were drug offenders, and 16
percent were incarcerated for other crimes or parole violations.
Next, descriptive statistics for the variables in the deterrence model will be
discussed.
Deterrence Variables
To measure an inmate’s prior punishment, respondents were asked if they had
previously spent time in an adult correctional facility, work center, or jail. Responses
were coded as 0 “No” and 1 “Yes.” The mean score for this indicator was .65, and the
standard deviation was .47, indicating that 65.4 percent report spending prior time in an
adult correctional facility.
The length of an inmate’s current sentence will be used as an indicator of sanction
severity. Sentence length is measured in years and ranges from 1 to 100. The mean
score for sentence length is 14.84 years, but the median sentence is 6 years. Standard
deviation for sentence length is 24.50.
To measure an inmate’s perceived severity of punishment, respondents were
asked if they agreed or disagreed that prison was a severe sentence. Only 41.7 percent of
inmates strongly agree that prison is a severe sentence, and 11 percent strongly disagree
that prison is a severe sentence. Responses ranged from 1 to 4. The mean score is 3.06
with a standard deviation of .99.
To measure inmates’ perceived certainty of punishment, respondents were asked
their level of certainty for being re-arrested if committing another crime. Responses
ranged from 0 to 10. Of respondents, 22.7 percent reported no certainty of being re76

arrested, and 35.6 percent reported that being re-arrested was “very likely.” The mean
score was 5.75 with a standard deviation of 4.01.
Descriptive statistics for the specific deterrence model are listed in Table 4.6.
Next, descriptive statistics for the variables included in the maximum capital model of reoffending will be discussed, beginning with community capital indicators.
Community Capital Variables
To measure an inmate’s capital in the community, respondents were asked to
describe their employment status prior to incarceration. Approximately 42 percent of
inmates reported full-time employment prior to incarceration, and 58 percent reported
that they were not working full time. Respondents were also asked to report their highest
level of education prior to incarceration. In the final sample, 7.3 percent had less than an
eighth grade education, 25.9 percent had only some high school and 38.8 percent reported
having a high school diploma or GED. In other words, approximately three-fourths of
the final sample has only a high school education or less. Another 18.8 percent of the
sample reports having some college, and 6.9 percent and 2.3 percent report having
completed college and attended graduate or professional school, respectively.
Inmates were also asked to describe their social class prior to incarceration. Of
the final sample, 11.2 percent of respondents described themselves as being lower class,
and 19.5 percent described themselves as being lower-middle class. Another 43.3
percent of respondents described themselves as middle class, and 18.3 percent reported
being upper-middle class. Only 7.6 percent of the sample described themselves as upper
class.
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As a measure of community cultural capital, inmates were asked if prison was
expected of them prior to incarceration. Of the final sample, 10.8 percent strongly
agreed, 16.5 percent agreed, 28.2 percent disagreed, and 44.5 percent strongly disagreed
that prison was expected of them prior to incarceration. To measure community
economic capital, inmates were asked if obtaining goods and services in the community
was easier than it is in prison. Of the final sample, 56.2 percent strongly agreed, 29.1
percent agreed, 7.3 percent disagreed, and another 7.3 percent strongly disagreed that
obtaining goods and services in the community is easier than it is in prison.
An index variable was computed using various community social capital
indicators. The average index score for community social capital was 2.8 with a standard
deviation of .71. Average scores ranged from 1 to 4. To test for internal consistency in
this index, Cronbach’s alpha was computed. The alpha value for the four items included
in this index was .70, suggesting an acceptable level of internal consistency among the
items. Descriptive statistics for the prison capital indicators will now be discussed.
Prison Capital Variables
To measure inmates’ prison capital, index variables were created to represent
various prison capital indicators. One of the prison capital indexes is indicative of the
overall prison experience. The mean score of this particular prison capital indicator was
1.69 with a standard deviation of .64. Average scores ranged from 1 to 4. To check for
internal consistency in this index, Cronbach’s alpha was computed. The alpha coefficient
for the six items included in this index was .85, suggesting relatively high internal
consistency.
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Another index was created to indicate inmates’ relationships with prison staff.
Average scores ranged from 1 to 4, with higher scores representing better relationships
with prison staff members. The mean score of this index was 2.47 with a standard
deviation of .70. To check for internal consistency in this index, Cronbach’s alpha was
computed. The alpha coefficient for the six items included in this index was .82,
suggesting that these items have relatively high internal consistency.
Descriptive statistics for variables used in the maximum capital model of reoffending are listed in Table 4.6. Next, descriptive statistics for the dependent variable
will be discussed.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is likelihood of re-offending. Responses
were coded as 0 “no likelihood of re-offending” and 1 “some likelihood of re-offending.
The mean score for the dependent variable was .58, and the standard deviation was .49.
Of the sample, 58.3 percent report at least some likelihood of re-offending upon release,
and 41.7 percent report no likelihood of re-offending upon release. Descriptive statistics
for the dependent variable are listed in Table 4.6.
Considering that all respondents are currently serving time, it is surprising that
58.3 percent of inmates report at least some likelihood of re-offending upon release and
only 41.7 percent report no likelihood of re-offending upon release. These statistics
alone reiterate the importance of this study. Since the respondents are from an inmate
population, with the effects of punishment fresh on their minds, they should report that
they have no likelihood of re-offending if specific deterrence has any merit.
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Statistical Methods
The data analysis for this research proceeded in several stages. First, bivariate
correlations were calculated. Next, the relationship between deterrence indicators and
inmates’ likelihood of re-offending was tested using logistic regression. Finally, logistic
regression was used to analyze the proposed relationship between inmates’ community
capital, inmates’ prison capital and their likelihood of re-offending upon release. In the
first model, likelihood of re-offending was regressed on gender, race, age, marital status,
and crime type. This model will be designated as Model 1.
In Model 2, deterrence indicators were added to Model 1. In this model,
likelihood of re-offending was regressed on gender, race, age, marital status, crime type,
prior punishment, length of current sentence, perception of prison severity, and
perception of certainty of re-arrest. This model will be compared to Model 1 to
determine goodness of fit.
After establishing the significance of the specific deterrence indicators on
likelihood of re-offending, logistic regression was used to analyze the effect of
community capital and prison capital indicators on likelihood re-offending. In Model 3,
measures of community capital were added to the statistical control variables. In this
model, likelihood of re-offending was regressed on gender, race, age, marital status,
crime type, social class, education, employment, community economic capital,
community cultural capital, and the community social capital index variable. This model
will be compared to Model 1 to determine goodness of fit.
In Model 4, measures of prison capital were added to the statistical control
variables. In this model, likelihood of re-offending was regressed on gender, race, age,
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marital status, crime type, prison experience capital, and prison staff capital. This model
will be compared to Model 1 for goodness of fit.
After analyzing the results from Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, it will be
possible to determine the effectiveness of specific deterrence indicators as compared to
the various capital indicators in explaining likelihood of re-offending. Statistical results
will be discussed in the following chapter
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Table 4.1

Dependent and Control Variable Descriptions

Dependent Variable

Variable Descriptions

Likelihood of re-offending

Inmates’ self-reported likelihood of re-offending
0 = no likelihood 1= some likelihood

Control Variables

Variable Descriptions

Gender

Inmates’ gender
0 = female 1 = male

Race

Inmates’ race
0 = Other 1=African American

Age

Inmates’ age at time of survey
(measured in years)

Marital Status

Marital status prior to incarceration
0= not married 1= married

Violent Crime

Incarcerated for a violent crime
0= no 1= yes

Property Crime

Incarcerated for a property crime
0= no 1= yes

Drug Crime

Incarcerated for a drug crime
0= no 1= yes

Other Crime

Incarcerated for other crime or parole violation
0= no 1= yes

82

Table 4.2

Independent Variable Descriptions

Deterrence Model
Independent Variables

Variable Descriptions

Prior Punishment

Inmate has served prior time in an adult facility
0 = no 1= yes
Length of current sentence
(measured in years)
Prison is a severe sentence
1=strongly disagree 2= disagree 3=agree 4=strongly agree
Certainty of being arrested if committing crime
Range from 0=not at all likely to 10=very likely

Sentence
Severity
Certainty
Maximum Capital Model
Independent Variables

Variable Descriptions

Social Class

Inmate’s social class
1=lower class 2=lower middle class 3=middle class
4=upper middle class 5=upper class
Inmate’s highest level of education
1=8th grade or less 2=some high school 3=H.S. diploma or GED
4=some college 5=completed college 6=graduate or professional
school
Inmate’s work description prior to incarceration
0=not working full-time 1=working full-time
Obtaining goods and services in community was easier
than it is in prison.
1=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=agree
4=strongly agree
Going to prison was expected prior to incarceration
1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=disagree
4=strongly disagree
Index for community social capital
Range from 1 (low capital) to 4 (high capital)
Index for prison experience capital
Range from 1 (low capital) to 4 (high capital)
Index for relationship with prison staff
Range from 1 (low capital) to 4 (high capital)

Education

Employment
Community Economic
Capital
Community Cultural
Capital
Community Social
Capital
Prison Experience Capital
Prison Staff Capital
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Table 4.3

Missing Values and Mean Replacement for Community Social Capital
Index Variables

Do you agree with the following statements?
1=Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3=Agree 4=Strongly Agree
Community Social Capital Index (Cronbach’s Alpha=.70)

Missing
Mean
Values Replacement

Right before incarceration, I could depend on my
family for help.

3

3=Agree

Right before incarceration, I could depend on my
friends for help.

3

3=Agree

When I am released from prison, I will be able to
depend on my family for help.

4

3=Agree

When I am released from prison, I will be able to
depend on my friends for help.

3

2=Disagree
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Table 4.4

Missing Values and Mean Replacement for Prison Capital Index Variables

Do you agree with the following statements?
1=Strongly Disagree 2=Disagree 3=Agree 4=Strongly Agree
Prison Experience Index (Cronbach’s Alpha=.858)

Missing
Mean
Values Replacement

All things considered, life in prison can be easier
than life on the outside.

8

2=Disagree

I have gained more respect in prison than I did in
the community.

8

2=Disagree

I understand prison life better than I understand
life on the outside.

13

2=Disagree

I have more power in prison than I do in the
community.

12

2=Disagree

I have more in common with people in prison than
I do with people in the community.

10

2=Disagree

I have adjusted well to prison life.

7

2=Disagree

I basically get along with correctional staff.

5

3=Agree

Most correctional staff look out for me.

13

2=Disagree

If I were threatened or hurt by another inmate, I
would report it to correctional staff.

9

3=Agree

If I knew someone well in prison who was threatened or hurt
by another inmate, I would report it to correctional staff.

7

2=Disagree

If I didn’t know someone that well who was threatened or hurt
by another inmate, I would report it to correctional staff.

5

2=Disagree

If I were threatened or hurt by another inmate, my friends
would report it to correctional staff.

10

2=Disagree

Relationship with Prison Staff Index (Cronbach’s Alpha=.825)
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Table 4.5

Number of missing values for each variable and the mean replacement

Missing

Mean

Values

Replacement

Dependent Variable
Likelihood of re-offending

0

N/A

0
0
4
3
27
26
26
30

N/A
N/A
37
0 = not married
0 = no
0 = no
0 = no
0 = no

13
36
45
13

1 = yes
6 years
6
3=Agree

4
17
9
7
12
0
0
0

3 = middle class
3 = high school diploma or GED
0 = not working full time
3= Agree
3= Disagree
Values for indicators listed in Table 4.3
Values for indicators listed in Table 4.4
Values for indicators listed in Table 4.4

Control Variables
Gender
Race
Age
Marital Status
Violent Crime
Property Crime
Drug Crime
Other Crime
Specific Deterrence Model
Independent Variables
Prior Punishment
Length of sentence
Certainty
Severity
Maximum Capital Model
Independent Variables
Social Class
Education
Employment
Community Economic Capital
Community Cultural Capital
Community Social Capital
Prison Experience Capital
Prison Staff Capital
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Table 4.6

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Control, and Independent Variables

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Deviation

0

1

.5826

.49370

0
0
19
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
68
1
1
1
1
1

.5023
.4679
37.2408
.2018
.3028
.1972
.3372
.1560

.50057
.49954
10.38320
.40183
.45998
.39838
.47328
.36324

0
1
1
0

1
100
4
10

.6537
14.8486
3.0619
5.7523

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1

5
6
1
4
4
4
4
4

2.9151
2.9885
.4220
3.3417
3.0642
2.8234
1.6972
2.4679

Dependent Variable
Likelihood of re-offending
Control Variables
Gender
Race
Age
Marital Status
Violent Crime
Property Crime
Drug Crime
Other Crime
Specific Deterrence Model
Independent Variables
Prior Punishment
Length of Sentence
Severity
Certainty

.47635
24.506
.99577
4.0175

Maximum Capital Model
Independent Variables
Social Class
Education
Employment
Community Economic Capital
Community Cultural Capital
Community Social Capital
Prison Experience Index
Prison Staff Index
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1.06119
1.10687
.49445
.90221
1.01958
.71342
.64333
.70148

CHAPTER V
RESULTS

Several analytical methods have been employed in order to test the research
hypotheses stated in chapter 3. To determine if there is in fact association between the
independent and dependent variables, and to determine the direction of those proposed
relationships, bivariate correlations were computed. Additionally, logistic regression was
used to test the relationship between likelihood of re-offending and specific deterrence
indicators. Logistic regression was also employed to test the relationship between
likelihood of re-offending and community and prison capital indicators.
Bivariate Correlations
Bivariate correlations were estimated for all control, independent, and dependent
variables in this study. The primary reason for including bivariate correlations is to test
that the relationships between the independent and dependent variables are in the
expected direction. The correlations for variables used in the control model are presented
in Table 5.1.
Control Variables and Likelihood of re-offending
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and Tittle (1995) point out that gender, race, and
age are correlated with criminal activity; therefore, one would expect to find significant
relationships between these control variables and the dependent variable, likelihood of re88

offending. The literature suggests that males, African Americans, and younger people
are more prone to criminal activity (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Tittle 1995);
therefore, a positive relationship is expected between gender (coded as 1=Male) and
likelihood of re-offending. The relationship is positive (.022), but it fails to reach
statistical significance. Additionally, a positive relationship is expected between race
(coded as 1=Black) and likelihood of re-offending. To the contrary, this relationship is
negative (-.129) and statistically significant beyond the .01 level. Also, the relationship
between age and likelihood of re-offending is expected to be negative, since older
inmates should be less prone to commit additional crimes. In fact, the relationship is
negative (-.095) and statistically significant beyond the .05 level.
According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission (2014), married offenders are less
likely to re-offend than those who are single or divorced; therefore, one would expect to
find a significant negative relationship between being married and likelihood of reoffending. This relationship is indeed negative (-.049), but it fails to reach statistical
significance. Likelihood of re-offending is also related to the type of crime for which one
was incarcerated. According to Durose et al. (2014), property offenders are the most
likely to re-offend, followed consecutively by drug offenders and violent offenders. For
this sample, there is a positive relationship between property crime and likelihood of reoffending (.022), but it fails to reach statistical significance. There is also a positive
relationship between drug crime and likelihood of re-offending (.210), and this
relationship is statistically significant beyond the .01 level. There is a negative
relationship between violent crime and likelihood of re-offending (-.151) and “other”
crime and likelihood of re-offending (-.110). Both of these negative relationships
89

reached statistical significance beyond the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. These
correlations suggest that those incarcerated for drug crimes, compared to those
incarcerated for property, violent, and other offenses, will be more likely to re-offend
upon release.
Bivariate correlations for the specific deterrence indicators and the dependent
variable will now be discussed. These correlations are listed in Table 5.2.
Specific Deterrence Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
According to the specific deterrence model, perceived certainty and severity of
punishment, as well as having received prior punishment, should be negatively related to
likelihood of re-offending. The length of an inmate’s current sentence was used as an
indicator of sentence severity. According to the specific deterrence model, those who
receive more severe sentences should be less likely to re-offend upon release. The
relationship between sentence length and likelihood of re-offending is indeed negative (.088); however, this relationship fails to reach statistical significance. Whether an inmate
perceives his or her punishment to be severe was also used an indicator of punishment
severity. According to the specific deterrence model, those who perceive punishment to
be severe should be less likely to re-offend upon release. This relationship is indeed
negative (-.130) and statistically significant beyond the .01 level. These correlations
suggest that it may not be the actual severity of a particular punishment, but an offender’s
perception of that punishment, that influences likelihood of re-offending. These
correlations also suggest that African Americans (-.165) and males (-.155) are less likely
to perceive of prison as a severe sentence. These relationships are significant at the .01
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level. Regardless of the amount of time an inmate is given, this punishment will not have
a deterrent effect unless it is perceived as a severe sentence by the inmate.
Higher certainty of re-arrest for committing another crime upon release should be
negatively related to likelihood of re-offending, according to the specific deterrence
model. On the contrary, this relationship was positive (.029) but failed to reach statistical
significance.
According to the specific deterrence model, those inmates who have received
prior punishment should be less likely to re-offend upon release; therefore, the expected
relationship between prior punishment and likelihood of re-offending should be negative.
On the contrary, the relationship between having previously served time in an adult
facility and likelihood of re-offending was positive (.215) and highly statistically
significant beyond the .01 level. Another interesting finding is the relationship between
the perception of incarceration as a severe sentence and having previously served time in
an adult facility. This relationship is negative (-.215) and highly statistically significant
beyond the .01 level. One possible explanation is that prior punishment reduces an
inmate’s perception about the severity of prison by decreasing community capital and
increasing prison capital.
If an inmate perceives living in the community to be difficult, at least in
comparison to living in prison, then the possibility of returning to prison in the future
appears more likely. This possibility will be further examined in the following section.
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Community Capital Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
The proposed relationship in the Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending
suggests that community capital indicators will be negatively associated with likelihood
of re-offending. These correlations can be found in Table 5.3.
Due to the economic capital that employment can provide, the relationship
between working full-time prior to incarceration and the likelihood of re-offending upon
release should be negative. This relationship is indeed negative (-.021) but fails to reach
statistical significance. As another indicator of community economic capital, inmates
were asked whether obtaining goods and services in the community was easier than it is
in prison. The relationship between this community economic capital indicator and
likelihood of re-offending is indeed negative (-.107) and statistically significant beyond
the .05 level.
As indicators of community cultural capital, inmates were asked to self-report
social class and highest level of education. According to the maximum capital model, the
relationship between social class, education, and likelihood of re-offending should be
negative. These relationships were indeed negative (-.090 and -.026 consecutively), but
both failed to reach statistical significance. As another indicator of community cultural
capital, inmates were asked whether or not it was expected of them to go to prison, prior
to incarceration. The relationship between the indicator for community cultural capital
and likelihood of re-offending should be negative. The relationship between this
community cultural capital indicator and likelihood of re-offending is indeed negative (.216) and statistically significant beyond the .01 level. It is also important to note the
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significant relationship between being African American, male, and feeling that going to
prison was expected of them.
The Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending also suggests a negative
relationship between community social capital and likelihood of re-offending. To
measure an inmate’s community social capital, an index was created to represent the
degree in which an inmate could rely on family and friends for help upon release. The
relationship between community social capital and likelihood of re-offending was indeed
negative (-.125) and statistically significant beyond the .01 level.
In addition to the effects of community capital on likelihood of re-offending, the
Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending suggests that capital gained from the
experience of prison should increase the likelihood of re-offending upon release. The
correlations for the prison capital indicators and likelihood of re-offending will be
discussed next.
Prison Capital Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
The proposed relationship in the Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending
suggests that prison capital indicators will be positively associated with likelihood of reoffending. These correlations can be found in Table 5.4.
The relationship between the index variable measuring various forms of capital
gained from the prison experience and likelihood of re-offending should be positive. This
relationship is indeed positive (.179) and highly statistically significant beyond the .01
level. There is also a significant positive relationship between gender and prison
experience capital, suggesting that males have more prison experience capital than do
females.
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The relationship between the index variable measuring prison staff capital and
likelihood of re-offending should be positive. To the contrary, this relationship is
negative (-.128) and highly statistically significant beyond the .01 level. Positive
relationships with staff members may actually indicate ties to conventional society and
respect for rules and authority. In this sense, prison staff capital should be negatively
related to likelihood of re-offending. Females, African Americans, and older inmates
report more prison staff capital than their counterparts.
Next, significant indicators from the deterrence and capital models will be
explored to determine further relationships between the variables.
Capital and Punishment Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
After running bivariate correlations for the specific deterrence and maximum
capital model, and noticing that prior punishment actually decreased perceptions of
severity of prison sanctions and increased likelihood of re-offending, bivariate
correlations were computed to test the relationship between prior punishment,
perceptions of prison severity, the significant community and prison capital indicators,
and likelihood of re-offending. These correlations can be found in Table 5.5.
When examining the relationship between prior punishment and the various
capital indicators, certain patterns emerged. The relationship between those who had
previously been incarcerated and the community capital indicators were all negative and
statistically significant beyond the .01 level. In addition, having previously been
incarcerated was negatively related to prison staff capital, and this relationship was
statistically significant beyond .05 level. On the other hand, the relationship between
prior punishment and the index for various prison capital indicators was positive, but it
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fell just short of statistical significance (p=.087). Bivariate correlations were also run for
the individual prison experience capital index variables and likelihood of re-offending.
All of these relationships were positive and statistically significant, and can be found in
Table 5.6. These findings suggest that prior punishment may actually increase likelihood
of re-offending by increasing the volume and composition of prison capital while
simultaneously decreasing community capital. To further examine this claim, the
specific deterrence and capital models were tested using logistic regression. Next, the
findings of these analyses will be presented.
Logistic Regression Analysis
Logistic regression was employed to examine the effects of the specific
deterrence indicators (certainty, severity, and prior punishment) in determining likelihood
of re-offending. Also, logistic regression was used to determine the effectiveness of
community and prison capital indicators in determining likelihood of re-offending.
Control Variables and Likelihood of Re-offending
The results of models testing the relationship between the control variables,
deterrence indicators, and likelihood of re-offending are listed in Table 5.7. Model 1
examines the relationship between gender, race, age, marital status, crime type, and
likelihood of re-offending. The race indicator was statistically significant beyond the .05
level; however, the direction of this relationship was surprising. Previous research
suggests that blacks have higher recidivism rates than do whites (Langan and Levin
2002). Model 1 suggests otherwise. Holding other independent variables in the model
constant, on average, the odds of re-offending for African American inmates are 38
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percent less than the odds for other inmates in the sample. Also, the relationship between
being incarcerated for a drug crime and likelihood of re-offending was positive and
statistically significant. This is consistent with findings from previous recidivism studies
(Langan and Levin 2002; Pew Center on the States 2011). When holding other variables
in Model 1 constant, those who are incarcerated for drug crimes are 2.4 times more likely
to re-offend than are inmates incarcerated for violent crimes. Model 1 Chi-Square is
31.402 and statistically significant beyond the .01 level. This model correctly classified
61 percent of cases.
Deterrence Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
Coefficients and odds ratios for the deterrence indicators and likelihood of reoffending are also listed in Table 5.7. In Model 2, deterrence indicators were added to
the statistical control group.

This model was used to test several hypotheses, including

hypothesis 1: Inmates with higher levels of perceived certainty of punishment will be less
likely to re-offend upon release. The direction of the relationship between certainty of rearrest and likelihood of re-offending was positive, contrary to the expected direction in
hypothesis 1; however, the certainty indicator failed to reach statistical significance.
Model 2 was also used to test hypothesis 2: Inmates with longer sentences will be
less likely to re-offend upon release. Contrary to this expected relationship, inmates with
longer sentences reported an increased likelihood of re-offending upon release; however,
this relationship failed to reach statistical significance.
Model 2 was also used to test hypothesis 3: Inmates with higher levels of
perceived severity of punishment will be less likely to re-offend upon releases. As
expected, inmates with greater perceptions of prison severity did report a decreased
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likelihood of re-offending. This severity indicator was statistically significant beyond the
.01 level. Holding all other independent variables in the model constant, on average,
every one unit shift toward the “strongly agree” category decreased the odds of reoffending by 26 percent. Previous literature suggests that offender’s perceptions of
prison severity vary according to offender characteristics (Wood and Grasmick 1999;
Crouch 1993; Spelman 1995; Wood and May 2003; May et al. 2005; May and Wood
2010). Those offenders who view prison as a severe sentence are more likely to be
deterred from future offending by the risk of returning to prison once again. On the other
hand, those who do not view prison as a severe sentence are less likely to be deterred by
the risk of an additional prison sanction.
Model 2 was also used to test hypothesis 4: Inmates who have received prior
punishment will be less likely to re-offend upon release. The prior punishment indicator
was highly statistically significant beyond the .01 level; however, this indicator does not
support the direction of the relationship indicated in hypothesis 4. In fact, prior
punishment increased an inmate’s likelihood of re-offending. Holding all other
independent variables in the model constant, on average, the odds of re-offending for
those who have previously been incarcerated are 2.3 times greater than the odds for those
who have not been previously incarcerated. Wood (2007) also found that those who had
previously been incarcerated had an increased likelihood of re-offending upon release.
Statistical controls, race and drug crime, remained significant.
Model 2 chi-square was 56.173 and statistically significant beyond the .01 level.
After performing a log likelihood ratio test, the deterrence indicators were statistically
significant as a group, and Model 2 correctly classified 65.6 percent of cases.
97

Overall, the findings listed in Table 5.7 lend partial support to the claims of
traditional deterrence; however, some of the findings directly refute those claims. Actual
severity of a prison sentence (measured as years of current sentence) is shown to increase
likelihood of re-offending; however, this relationship does not reach statistical
significance. On the other hand, perception of prison as a severe sentence is significantly
shown to reduce likelihood of re-offending. Certainty of re-arrest had no significant
effect on likelihood of re-offending, contrary to claims of traditional deterrence theory.
Also, at odds with traditional deterrence claims, prior punishment had a significant
positive effect on likelihood of re-offending, adding to the line of positive punishment
research (Wood 2007; Pogarsky and Piquero 2003; Sherman 1993; Piquero and Pogarsky
2002).
Community Capital Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
Coefficients and odds ratios for the community capital indicators and likelihood
or re-offending are listed in Table 5.8. In Model 3, community capital indicators were
added to the statistical control group. This model was set up to address hypothesis 5:
Inmates with higher levels of community capital will be less likely to re-offend upon
release. Several indicators were used to measure community capital, but not all of them
supported the relationship indicated in hypothesis 5. In fact, the relationships between
full-time employment, level of education, and likelihood of re-offending were positive;
however, these relationships failed to reach statistical significance. Social class was also
used as an indicator of community capital. The relationship between social class and
likelihood of re-offending was indeed negative; however, this relationship also failed to
reach statistical significance.
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Partial support for hypothesis 5 was found when examining the relationships
between several other community capital indicators and likelihood of re-offending.
Inmates were asked whether obtaining goods and services in the community was easier
than it is in prison. Holding all other variables in the model constant, every one unit
increase toward the “strongly agree” category, on average, decreased the odds of reoffending by 23 percent. This relationship was statistically significant beyond the .05
level. One needs money or property to obtain goods and services in the community;
however, prison offers economic opportunities to those who may not have had them on
the outside. Those who are able to provide for themselves in the community should be
less likely to re-offend. Research shows that finding employment and suitable housing
are key to staying out of prison (Bradley et al. 2001; Petersilia 2003; Rubinstein 2001;
Lipsey 1995; Bushway and Reuter 2002; Uggen 2000). An offender’s most basic
necessities for survival are provided in prison; however, the prison black market system
allows for goods and services to be traded for other goods and services. Hustlers and
“swag” men have a good deal of economic clout in prison (Gleason 1978; Hassine 2004).
If one is accustomed to “hustle” activities on the outside, then that offender should adjust
and do well in the prison underground economy (Gleason 1978).
As a measure of community cultural capital, inmates were asked whether going to
prison was expected of them prior to incarceration. Holding other variables in the model
constant, on average, every one unit shift toward the “strongly disagree” category
corresponded with a 36 percent decrease in likelihood of re-offending. This relationship
was statistically significant beyond the .01 level. Zimring and Hawkins (1973) argue that
prison sanctions would serve more as a deterrent if an offender’s reputation or social
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standing was diminished in the light of punishment. Those who feel going to prison was
expected of them, and those who feel that going to prison was like a rite of passage, may
not suffer from a diminished reputation upon returning to their communities; therefore,
they may not be deterred by the risk of another prison sentence (Pettit and Western 2004).
To measure community social capital, inmates were asked whether they could
depend on friends and family prior to incarceration, as well as after they are released
from prison. Holding other variables in the model constant, on average, every one unit
shift toward the “strongly agree” category in the community social capital index
corresponded with a 28 percent decrease in likelihood of re-offending. Research shows
that those who maintain ties to their families and communities and those who have access
to social support may be less likely to re-offend (Bales and Mears 2008; Holtfreter et al.
2006)
In Model 3, several control variables were statistically significant. Holding other
variables in the model constant, on average, every one year increase in age corresponded
with a .02 percent decrease in likelihood of re-offending. Race and drug crime remained
significant.
Model 3 chi-square was 62.927 and statistically significant beyond the .01 level.
After performing a log likelihood ratio test, the community capital indicators were
statistically significant as a group, and Model 3 correctly classified 67.2 percent of cases.
Prison Capital Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
Coefficients and odds ratios for the prison capital indicators and likelihood of reoffending are also listed in Table 5.8. In Model 4, prison capital indicators were added to
the statistical control group. This model was used to test hypothesis 6: Inmates with
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higher levels of prison capital will be more likely to re-offend upon release. The
relationship between the prison capital index and likelihood of re-offending was indeed
positive and statistically significant beyond the .01 level, lending support for hypothesis
6. When holding all other independent variables in the model constant, on average, every
one unit shift toward the “strongly agree” category in the prison experience capital index
corresponds with an 84 percent increase in likelihood of re-offending. Those inmates
who see their overall experience in prison as being better than their overall experience in
the community may not be deterred by the risk of another prison sentence. These inmates
may have a particularly difficult time adjusting to life outside of prison, and this could
lead to an increased likelihood of re-offending. Inmates’ relationships with prison staff
was also used as an indicator of prison capital. Contrary to the proposed relationship in
hypothesis 6, the relationship between prison staff capital and likelihood of re-offending
was negative, but it failed to reach statistical significance. The effect of drug crime on
likelihood of re-offending remained significant in Model 4.
Model 4 chi-square was 47.252 and statistically significant beyond the .01 level.
After performing a log likelihood ratio test, the prison capital indicators were statistically
significant as a group, and Model 4 correctly classified 65.1 percent of cases.
Overall, the findings listed in Table 5.8 lend support to the Comparable Capital
Model of Re-offending. Model 3 shows that those ranking high in community capital
should be less likely to re-offend upon release, and Model 4 indicates that those ranking
high in prison capital should be more likely to re-offend upon release.
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Combined Deterrence and Capital Indicators and Likelihood of Re-offending
In Model 5, significant deterrence, community capital, and prison capital
indicators were added to the control group to test a capital and punishment model of reoffending. These findings are listed in Table 5.9.
With all variables included in the model, model chi-square was 78.152 and
statistically significant beyond the .01 level. After performing a log ratio test, the
indicators in Model 5 were statistically significant as a group, and Model 5 correctly
classified 67.2 percent of cases.
Across the various models, several indicators, including race, drug crime,
perceptions of prison severity, prior punishment, community cultural capital, and prison
experience capital, remained significant and robust. To further analyze the effects of the
deterrence and capital indicators on likelihood of re-offending, logistic regression was
employed to determine if these effects varied by gender, race, and crime type.
Gender and Likelihood of Re-offending
Male and female odds ratios for the control and deterrence indicators are listed in
Table 5.10. When comparing male and female offenders in Model 1, female drug
offenders are more likely to re-offend than are female violent offenders. In Model 2, the
effects of race, drug crime, and perception of prison severity are significant for female
offenders, and the effect of prior punishment is significant for both male and female
offenders. Among female offenders, African Americans and those who perceive prison
as a severe sentence are less likely to re-offend upon release, and female drug offenders
are more likely to re-offend than are female violent offenders. Prior punishment
increases likelihood of re-offending for both male and female offenders.
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Male and female odds ratios for the community and prison capital indicators are
listed in Table 5.11. In Model 3, the effects of age, drug crime, and community
economic capital are significant for females only, and the effect of employment (an
indicator of community economic capital) is significant for males only. The effect of
community cultural capital is significant for both male and female offenders. For
females, age and community economic capital reduce the likelihood of re-offending, and
female drug offenders are more likely to re-offend than are female violent offenders.
These findings are not surprising, considering the link between the feminization of
poverty and female drug selling and use (Diaz-Cotto 1996; Belknap 2001). For males,
those reporting full-time employment prior to incarceration are more likely to re-offend
than those who were not employed full-time prior to incarceration. Losing one’s fulltime employment due to incarceration may have a particularly detrimental effect on a
male offender’s community economic capital, increasing his likelihood of re-offending
upon release. For both males and females, community cultural capital decreases the
likelihood of re-offending upon release. It appears that societal expectations for success
and failure may lead to a “self-fulfilling prophecy” for both male and female offenders.
Once being labeled as a criminal, one may begin to see himself or herself as a criminal
and begin acting in a way that is consistent with the new identity (Hagan 1973). Also,
when offenders return to the community with the label of “ex-felon,” they will be denied
the proper avenues to better themselves, increasing the chance that they will re-offend
(Petersilia 2003). Sitren and Applegate (2012) contend that those who do not suffer from
informal consequences, such as shame or loss of important relationships, may not be
deterred by the threat of punishment. If going to prison is already expected of an
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offender, then he or she will be less likely to suffer informal consequences in the
community due to another prison sentence.
When comparing male and female offenders in Model 4, the effect of drug crime
remains positive and significant for females only. The effect of prison experience is
significant for both male and female offenders, increasing the likelihood of re-offending
for both groups. This finding suggests that both men and women offenders who adjust
well to prison life may not be deterred by the possibility of another prison sentence.
Male and female odds ratios for the combined deterrence and capital indicators
are listed in Table 5.12. The effects of race, drug crime, perception of prison severity,
and community economic capital are significant for females only in Model 5. The effect
of community cultural capital is significant for male offenders only. Female offenders
who are African American, have higher perceptions of prison severity, and who have
more community economic capital will be less likely to re-offend upon release. Once
again, female drug offenders are more likely to re-offend than are female violent
offenders. Among male offenders, those with higher amounts of community cultural
capital will be less likely to re-offend upon release. To further analyze the effects of the
deterrence and capital indicators on likelihood of re-offending, logistic regression was
employed to compare African American and non-black offenders.
Race and Likelihood of Re-offending
African American and non-black odds ratios for the control and deterrence
indicators are listed in Table 5.13. In Model 1, the effect of drug crime is significant for
non-black offenders only. Non-black drug offenders are more likely to re-offend than are
non-black violent offenders. In Model 2, the effects of drug crime and perceptions of
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prison severity are significant for non-black offenders only. The effect of prior
punishment is significant for both African American and non-black offenders. Non-black
drug offenders are more likely to re-offend than are non-black violent offenders, and high
perceptions of prison severity decrease the likelihood of re-offending for non-black
offenders. Both African American and non-black offenders who have been previously
incarcerated are more likely to re-offend upon release.
African American and non-black offender odds ratios for the community and
prison capital indicators are listed in Table 5.14. In Model 3, the effects of age, drug
crime, community economic capital, and community social capital are significant for
non-black offenders only, and community cultural capital is significant for both African
American and non-black offenders. Non-black drug offenders are more likely to reoffend than are non-black violent offenders. Also, among non-black offenders, those
who are older and have more community economic and social capital will be less likely
to re-offend upon release. In Model 4, the effect of staff capital is significant for African
American offenders, and drug crime and prison experience capital are significant for nonblack offenders. Among African American offenders, those who report better
relationships with prison staff members have decreased odds of re-offending upon
release. Non-black drug offenders are more likely to re-offend than are non-black violent
offenders, and non-black offenders with high prison experience capital have increased
odds of re-offending upon release.
African American and non-black odds ratios for the combined deterrence and
capital indicators are listed in Table 5.15. In Model 5, the effects of age, drug crime,
prior punishment, and community economic capital are significant for non-black
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offenders only. Non-black drug offenders and those who have received prior punishment
have increased odds of re-offending. Among non-black offenders, those who are older
and who have community economic capital have decreased odds of re-offending upon
release. Among African American offenders, those with community cultural capital have
decreased odds of re-offending upon release. Since 1 in 3 African American males will
come under the control of the criminal justice system, unfortunately, going to prison is
expected of many living in African American communities (Pettit and Western 2004;
Irwin and Austin 1997; Garland 2001; Mauer 1999). If African American offenders only
experience formal punishment for their crimes, such as prison time, and they do not
experience informal consequences, such as shame, then they may not be deterred by the
threat of future prison sanctions (Sitren and Applegate 2012).
After comparing the various gender and race models, several interactions are
important to note. Being incarcerated for a drug crime increases the odds of re-offending,
as compared to those incarcerated for violent offenses; however, this effect is strongest
for female and non-black offenders, suggesting a three-way interaction between gender,
race, and crime type. African American offenders in this sample have decreased odds of
re-offending, as compared to non-blacks; however, this effect is strongest for female
offenders. Perceiving prison as a severe sentence decreases the odds of re-offending, and
this effect is significant for female and non-black offenders. Prior punishment increases
the odds of re-offending; however, this effect is stronger for female and non-black
offenders. Having higher community economic capital decreases the odds of reoffending; however, this effect is strongest for female and non-black offenders. Having
higher amounts of community cultural capital reduces the odds of re-offending, and this
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effect is significant for both male and female offenders, along with both African
American and non-black offenders. Having higher amounts of community social capital
reduces an inmate’s odds of re-offending; however, this effect is significant for non-black
offenders only. Having higher amounts of prison experience capital increases an
inmate’s odds of re-offending, and this effect is significant for both male and female
offenders and non-black offenders. Having higher amounts of prison staff capital can
decrease the odds of re-offending, but this effect only holds true for African American
offenders.
After comparing the various gender and race models, the three way interaction
between race, gender, and drug crime was further investigated. To better understand
these relationships, logistic regression was employed to compare drug offenders to nondrug offenders.
Drug Offenders and Likelihood of Re-offending
Drug and non-drug offender odds ratios for the control and specific deterrence
indicators are given in Table 5.16. In Model 1, the effect of gender is significant for both
drug and non-drug offenders. Male drug offenders are less likely to re-offend than are
female drug offenders; however, among non-drug offenders, males have increased odds
of re-offending. In Model 2, the effects of gender and race are significant for drug
offenders only, and the effect of prior punishment is significant for non-drug offenders
only. The effect of perceptions of prison severity is significant for both drug and nondrug offenders. Among drug offenders, African Americans and males have decreased
odds of re-offending as compared to non-black and female offenders. For non-drug
offenders, those who have received prior punishment have increased odds of re-offending
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as compared to those who have not received prior punishment. For both drug and nondrug offenders, perceptions of prison as a severe sentence reduce the odds of reoffending.
Drug and non-drug offender odds ratios for the community and prison capital
indicators are listed in Table 5.17. The effects of race and education are significant for
drug offenders only, and the effects of age, community economic capital, and community
social capital are significant for non-drug offenders only. The effects of gender and
community cultural capital are significant for both drug and non-drug offenders. Among
drug offenders, males have decreased odds of re-offending; however, among non-drug
offenders, males have increased odds of re-offending. Among drug offenders, African
Americans and those with higher levels of education have decreased odds of reoffending. Among non-drug offenders, those who are older and those who have higher
levels of economic and social capital in the community have decreased odds of reoffending. For both drug and non-drug offenders, higher levels of community cultural
capital decrease odds of re-offending.
Model 4, in Table 5.17, compares the effects of prison capital on both drug and
non-drug offenders. The effect of gender is significant for drug offenders only, and the
effects of prison staff capital and prison experience capital are significant for non-drug
offenders only. Among non-drug offenders, those reporting better relationships with
prison staff have decreased odds of re-offending; however, non-drug offenders with
higher prison experience capital have increased odds of re-offending.
Drug and non-drug offender odds ratios for the combined deterrence and capital
indicators are listed in Table 5.18. In Model 5, the effects of gender, race, and
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perceptions of prison severity are significant for drug offenders only, and the effects of
prior punishment, community social capital, and prison experience capital are significant
for non-drug offenders only. The effect of community cultural capital is significant for
both drug and non-drug offenders. Among drug offenders, African Americans, males,
those with high perceptions of prison severity, and those with high levels of community
cultural capital have decreased odds of re-offending upon release. Among non-drug
offenders, those with high levels of community social capital have decreased odds of reoffending; however, those who have previously been incarcerated and those with high
levels of prison experience capital have increased odds of re-offending. For both drug
and non-drug offenders, those with higher levels of community cultural capital have
decreased odds of re-offending.
After comparing the effects of the various control, deterrence, and capital
indicators on perceptions of likelihood of re-offending for both drug and non-drug
offenders, several findings are worthy of discussion. First, among drug offenders, nonblack and female offenders have increased odds of perceiving a likelihood of reoffending. This could be due to the fact that 63.3 percent of non-black offenders and
54.4 percent of female offenders in this study were incarcerated for a drug crime. In a
New York Times article by Goode (2013), Marc Mauer, the executive director of the
Sentencing Project, claims that the incarceration rates for African American men and
women have been declining in recent years, but the incarceration rates for white men and
women have been increasing during the same time period. In this article, Mauer was
reported as attributing these trends to changes in drug laws, the rising number of whites
and Hispanics serving time for methamphetamine related crimes, and socioeconomic
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trends that have disproportionately affected white women (Goode, 2013). Contrary to
drug offenders, being male increases the odds of re-offending for non-drug offenders.
Another interesting finding when comparing drug and non-drug offenders is that
the effect of prior punishment on likelihood of re-offending is positive for both groups,
but this effect is significant for non-drug offenders only. Langan and Levin (2002)
report that recidivism rates vary by offense type, with property offenders having the
highest rates, followed by drug and violent offenders. When comparing the two groups,
73.5 percent of drug offenders in this study had previously been incarcerated. Only 61.2
percent of non-drug offenders had previously been incarcerated, and these numbers
varied further when comparing property, violent, and other offenses, all of which are
included in the non-drug category.
The effects of community capital also vary when comparing drug and non-drug
offenders. For non-drug offenders, the effects of community economic, cultural, and
social capital decrease the odds of re-offending upon release; however, for drug
offenders, only the effects of the two cultural capital indicators significantly reduce the
odds of re-offending. The effect of education reduces the odds of re-offending for drug
offenders. This is encouraging because it suggests that the odds of re-offending can be
altered by providing education to drug offenders in particular.
The effects of prison capital are significant for non-drug offenders only. Among
these offenders, positive relationships with prison staff members decrease the odds of reoffending. Also, for non-drug offenders, prison experience capital significantly increases
the odds of re-offending. On average, non-drug offenders, particularly violent offenders,
serve longer sentences. As inmates interact over a period of time with other inmates who
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value things such as violence and toughness, their commitments to a criminal lifestyle are
further developed and reinforced (Goffman 1961; Kassebaum et al. 1971; Sykes 1958;
Wheeler 1961; Akers 1998). This could explain why non-drug offenders with prison
experience capital have increased odds of re-offending upon release.
The findings from the various gender, race, and crime type models offer further
insight into perceptions of likelihood of re-offending. In particular, deterrence and
capital indicators have varying effects on likelihood of re-offending, depending on the
category of offender. Next, the findings from the original deterrence and capital models,
with all offenders included, will be compared and discussed.
Comparison of Capital and Deterrence Models
The purpose of this research was to examine factors that influence the likelihood
of re-offending by testing two separate models: a specific deterrence model of reoffending and a comparable capital model of re-offending. It is important to note that the
Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending offers a new way of conceptualizing
characteristics that may increase likelihood of re-offending. Even though much of this
research was exploratory, and there are numerous ways to conceptualize the various
forms of capital, the indicators used in the models did lend support to the claims of the
capital model.
Contrary to the exploratory nature of the capital model indicators, the ideas
behind deterrence have been around for some time. The lack of support for most of the
deterrence claims tested in Model 2 may be surprising; however, when looking more
closely at the findings from the deterrence model, it is possible that those significant
deterrence indicators can be explained by the comparable capital model.
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The Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending shown in Figure 3.2 suggests that
there is an inverse relationship between community capital and prison capital, and that
those with higher amounts of prison capital will be more likely to re-offend.
Assumptions about prison capital can be made from the two significant deterrence
indicators, severity and prior punishment. It may be helpful to look at these indicators
from two different perspectives. From a deterrence perspective, perceptions of prison as
a severe sentence should reduce one’s likelihood of re-offending, and this claim was
supported by this research. It is conceivable that those who perceive prison as a severe
sentence are the ones who have less prison capital; therefore, the comparable capital
model also explains why perceptions of prison severity are related to likelihood of reoffending. Those having high amounts of prison capital may feel that they fare better
within prison walls. If an inmate feels that life in prison is better, or at least no worse,
than life in the community, then likelihood of re-offending and returning to prison
increases.
The relationship between prior punishment and likelihood of re-offending can be
examined from both the deterrence and comparable capital perspectives. The specific
deterrence model shown in Figure 3.1 suggests that prior punishment should decrease the
likelihood of re-offending. If this were accurate, none of the inmates in this sample
would have reported a likelihood of re-offending, since they were all serving time when
this data was collected. One would also expect that those inmates who had been
incarcerated prior to their current sentence would be the least likely to re-offend upon
release due to increased perceptions of certainty and severity of sanctions. It is the
finding in Model 2 that is most damning to the deterrence perspective. Instead of prior
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punishment decreasing the likelihood of re-offending, this model suggests that prior
punishment actually increases the likelihood that an inmate will re-offend upon release.
Although this finding refutes the deterrence claims, it lends great support to the claims
made by the comparable capital model. From the comparable capital perspective, prior
punishment would increase an inmate’s likelihood of re-offending upon release due to
punishment’s effect on community and prison capital.
Having previously served in an adult facility can lead to divergent levels of
capital in prison and in the community. Those with criminal records may have a more
difficult time obtaining economic security through legitimate means because people are
reluctant to hire them (Holzer et al. 2002; Holzer 1996; Western et al. 2001). Exoffenders are also barred from working in certain types of jobs (Petersilia 2003; Clear and
Cole 2000; Kuzma 1998). When ex-offenders are able to gain employment, they earn
less than non-offenders working in similar jobs (Western et al. 2001). Also, having a
criminal record does not exactly increase one’s standing in his or her community.
According to Western and Pettit (2010: 16), mass imprisonment has created a “new class
of social outsiders whose relationship to the state and society is wholly different from the
rest of the population.” Also, those who have previously been incarcerated may have
fewer sources of social support from the government, friends, and family due to the
incarceration (Rubinstein and Mukamel 2002; Petersilia 2003; Mauer 2003b; Pogrebin
and Dodge 2001; Frost et al. 2006). When economic, cultural, and social potential is
limited in the community, and one has familiarity with prison, it is not surprising that an
inmate would prefer prison over the community if he or she feels that potential can be
maximized within that prison society.
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After running and analyzing the various capital and deterrence models, it appears
that the comparable capital perspective offers the best conceptualization of why inmates
will choose to re-offend upon release. The most important claim of specific deterrence is
that prior punishment will keep people from re-offending. If this claim is refuted, as it
has been in this research, then it is difficult to support the deterrence perspective, at least
as it currently stands. Instead, the idea of prior punishment can be incorporated into the
Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending. This new model that incorporates prior
punishment, as well as community and prison capital, will be called the Capital and
Punishment Model of Re-offending. Bivariate correlations in Table 5.5 show that prior
punishment is indeed positively related to prison experience capital and inversely related
to the community capital indicators. Bivariate correlations in Table 5.6 further show the
significant positive relationships between the various prison experience capital indicators
and likelihood of re-offending. The Capital and Punishment Model of Re-offending is
shown in Figure 5.1.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the significant findings of
the study. Limitations and implications will also be discussed.
Summary of Findings
The purpose of this research was to examine factors that increase the likelihood of
re-offending. Specifically, the purpose was to examine how economic, cultural, and
social capital in the community, as well as in prison, affect self-reported likelihood of reoffending upon release, and to examine if these indicators are better suited for explaining
offending as compared to those included in the deterrence model.
The policies that have led to mass incarceration in the United States have been
largely influenced by ideas of traditional deterrence, particularly the belief that severe
punishments will deter both offenders and potential offenders from future criminality.
Unfortunately, as the correctional system and its corresponding budgets have grown
exponentially to accommodate the mass increase in the number of offenders and the
lengths of their sentences, we have not seen corresponding large decreases in crime rates.
Mass incarceration may have a limited effect on crime rates and severe sentences may
deter some criminality; but the recidivism rates in this country call into question the
effectiveness of the “get tough on crime” policies that have pervaded the U.S. criminal
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justice system for more than thirty years. With nearly two-thirds of released offenders
being arrested for a new crime within three years, it is important to discover if and how
previous punishment experiences affect the likelihood of future offending. It is no longer
fiscally feasible to incarcerate such large numbers of offenders without addressing the
possibility that incarceration experiences may actually increase the likelihood that these
offenders will return to crime, and subsequently to prison, soon after their release.
To better understand why such a large proportion of released offenders appear
undeterred by the possibility of future prison sanctions, two models of re-offending were
tested using a sample of adult incarcerated offenders. The specific deterrence model
examined the effects of the certainty and severity of punishment, along with previous
punishment experiences, on an inmate’s perceived likelihood of re-offending upon
release. Statistical analysis of these relationships revealed several important findings.
First, perceived certainty of re-arrest and actual severity of punishment (measured as
years of current sentence), had no significant effect on perceived likelihood of reoffending. Second, the perception of prison as a severe sentence decreased the perceived
likelihood of re-offending, and this finding was statistically significant. This finding
suggests that one’s experience in prison may have more of an effect on likelihood of reoffending than the actual length of their sentence. Finally, those offenders who had been
previously incarcerated in an adult correctional facility were 2.3 times more likely to
report a likelihood of re-offending upon release than those who were incarcerated for the
first time. This statistically significant finding is completely at odds with deterrence
claims and suggests that prison punishment experiences may have an effect that is quite
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opposite of that which is intended. This finding was statistically significant irrespective
of gender and racial categories.
To shed further light on likelihood of re-offending, a proposed capital model was
tested, paying particular attention to the effects of economic, cultural, and social capital,
both in the community and in prison. Statistical analysis of these relationships revealed
that those inmates with higher levels of economic, cultural, and social capital in the
community were less likely to perceive a likelihood of re-offending upon release, lending
support to the proposed capital model. Upon further investigation, several interactions
were discovered. The effect of community economic capital was stronger for female
offenders, as compared to male offenders, and for non-black offenders, as compared to
African American offenders, suggesting that poverty plays an especially important role in
the criminality of both females and non-blacks. The effect of community social capital
was stronger for non-blacks, as compared to African Americans, suggesting that
maintaining ties to family and friends in the community is especially important to reduce
future offending for non-black offenders. The effect of community cultural capital on
perceived likelihood of re-offending was significant irrespective of gender or racial
category, suggesting that informal consequences, such as shame and diminished
reputation in the community, are important for reducing future offending. If going to
prison was expected of the offender prior to incarceration, it is unlikely that an actual
prison sentence will do much to denigrate an already degenerate reputation.
To further test the proposed comparable capital model, the effect of prison capital
on perceived likelihood of re-offending was examined. Higher levels of prison capital
increase the likelihood that inmates will re-offend upon release, and this relationship was
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statistically significant for both male and female offenders; however, this effect was
stronger for non-blacks as compared to African Americans, suggesting that positive or
negative prison experiences are especially important in predicting future offending by
non-black offenders.
It is also important to note that the effects of crime type and race on likelihood of
re-offending were statistically significant. One of the most surprising findings of this
study was that African Americans are 38 percent less likely than other inmates to selfreport a likelihood of re-offending upon release. Research on actual rates of re-offending
show that African Americans are more likely to re-offend than are whites (Langan and
Levin 2002; United States Sentencing Commission 2004). The discrepancy between the
findings of this study and those of other studies could be due to measurement. For this
study, in lieu of actual arrest records, self-reported likelihood of re-offending was used as
an indicator of recidivism. African Americans may be less likely than other inmates to
report that they will re-offend upon release; however, there is no guarantee that this will
translate into actual lower numbers of re-offending once released back into the
community. Nonetheless, this finding is interesting and in need of further investigation.
In line with previous research, the odds of re-offending for those arrested for
drug crimes are higher than the odds of re-offending for those arrested for violent crimes;
however, this effect is much stronger for female offenders, as compared to male
offenders, and for non-black offenders, as compared to African American offenders,
suggesting that being arrested for a drug crime is an especially strong predictor of future
offending for females and non-blacks.
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By examining the effects of the indicators used in both models, it was discovered
that traditional deterrence and capital indicators alone do not provide a sufficient
explanation of likelihood of re-offending. The proposed Capital and Punishment Model
of Re-offending may provide a better way of conceptualizing offenders’ likelihood of reoffending upon release because it considers the effects of community and prison capital,
while paying special attention to the effects of prior punishment.
Because the proposed Comparable Capital Model of Re-offending had never been
tested before, the indicators used in this study were simply exploratory in nature. There
are numerous ways that the various forms of capital could be conceptualized, and a
review of the literature in chapter two offers some suggestions.
Though the effects of community and prison capital on likelihood of re-offending
are significant and important, the finding that prior punishment actually increases the
likelihood of re-offending is also important. This fact alone discredits the claims of
specific deterrence. It is surprising enough that offenders who are currently serving
prison sentences would report any likelihood of re-offending upon release, since their
perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment are relatively fresh on their minds.
But it is even more surprising that those inmates who are serving at least their second
sentence in an adult facility would still report a likelihood of re-offending upon their next
release. If anyone should have strong perceptions of the certainty and severity of
punishment, it should be these offenders; however, the odds of these offenders reoffending upon release are 2.3 times greater than the odds for those offenders who are
serving their first sentence in an adult facility. This finding strongly suggests that
punishment experiences affect likelihood of re-offending; however, it does not explain
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how previous punishment experiences affect the likelihood of re-offending. Fortunately,
the proposed Capital and Punishment Model of Re-offending does explain this
relationship. Punishment experiences increase the likelihood of re-offending by
increasing levels of prison capital while simultaneously decreasing levels of capital in the
community. These divergent levels of capital will affect an inmate’s opportunities and
overall experiences both in prison and in the community. If an offender feels that he has
a more positive experience in prison, as compared to his experience in the community,
then the risk of a future prison sentence may do little to deter criminality. Divergent
levels of capital, both in prison and in the community, could explain why offenders differ
in their perceived likelihood of re-offending upon release.
Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations of this study that should be mentioned. First of all,
the sample is drawn from one facility in the state of Mississippi. It is possible that
offenders serving time in regional facilities experience prison life differently than those
housed at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility. Another limitation is sample size.
Participation was strictly voluntary, and the length of the survey may have discouraged
potential participants. Another potential limitation of the study has to do with the
indicators that were chosen to represent the elements of deterrence and the varying
amounts of community and prison capital. There are numerous ways to conceptualize the
different forms of community and prison capital and different methods to test their
effects. It may be possible that the variables chosen from this survey to indicate varying
levels of capital are not sufficient indicators in the first place. Regardless of the specific
indicators that were used in this particular study, future research should examine other
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indicators that fit into the economic, cultural, and social capital categories, both in the
community and in prison.
Another potential limitation of the study deals with one the most significant
indicators, prior punishment. Inmates were asked, “Before now, have you ever been
incarcerated in an adult correctional facility, work center, or jail.” Technically speaking,
all of the respondents had served time in a jail before being transferred to prison to serve
out their current sentences. Even though this survey item was meant to solicit
information about incarceration experiences prior to the current sentence, it is possible
that some offenders interpreted this question differently. Inmates were also asked to
report the types of crimes for which they had been previously incarcerated.
Approximately 64 percent of inmates reported at least one crime for which they had been
previously incarcerated. Because this percentage is similar to the finding that 65 percent
of inmates reported previously spending time in an adult facility, it is likely that the prior
punishment indicator actually represents those who were incarcerated for prior crimes.
Another limitation of the study is that it does not measure actual re-offending. It
measures self-reported likelihood of re-offending. It is possible that those who report a
likelihood of re-offending may not ever actually re-offend. In essence, we are measuring
differences in hypothetical likelihoods of re-offending.
There are also problems with the data used in this study. The main problem is
that there are several missing values for important indicators. Twenty cases alone were
lost due to missing information for the dependent variable, likelihood of re-offending.
When analyzing the cases that were removed due to missing information on the
dependent variable, it was discovered that 75 percent of those cases were also African
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American offenders. This could explain why African Americans in the final sample were
shown to have a reduced likelihood of re-offending upon release. It is possible that
African American offenders did not want to report any likelihood of re-offending,
believing that their responses could be used against them in some way. To keep from
losing additional cases, the mean value was substituted for the missing values on all other
independent variables in the study.
Regardless of the limitations of this study, the findings presented here could have
important implications, not only for future research, but also for correctional policy.
Next, these implications will be discussed.
Implications of the Study
There have been relatively few studies that examine the impact of punishment on
future offending, and many of those studies use college or high school students to test this
relationship. An important feature of the present study is its focus on a sample of
incarcerated adults to assess the effects of punishment experiences on likelihood of reoffending. Similar to the findings in Wood (2007), this research shows that prior
punishment can increase perceived likelihood of re-offending for adult incarcerated
offenders.
This study not only shows that prior punishment increases the perceived
likelihood of re-offending for adult incarcerated offenders, but it also offers an
explanation as to why punishment experiences increase the likelihood of future
criminality. Though few studies have examined the relationship between prior
punishment and recidivism for adult offenders, even fewer have attempted to explain this
relationship. Sherman (1993) offers a theory of “defiance” to explain why punishment
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increases future deviance and criminality. Punishment that is perceived as being unjust
or excessive can lead to defiant pride and shame, and these feelings can lead to future
criminality. Pogarsky and Piquero (2003) suggest that offenders make decisions based
on the “gambler’s fallacy.” After receiving punishment, offenders decide that they would
have to be extremely unlucky to be apprehended again for criminal activity. Pogarsky
and Piquero (2003) refer to this as the “resetting” effect. Offenders actually re-estimate
their likelihood of being apprehended again.
The Capital and Punishment Model of Re-offending offers another explanation as
to why previous punishment experiences would increase likelihood of re-offending.
Receiving punishment, a prison sentence in particular, increases one’s prison capital
while simultaneously decreasing one’s capital in the community. These divergent levels
of capital affect one’s lived experiences both in prison and in the community. Of those
offenders who reported that a prior prison experience made their life in prison easier this
time, 63 percent of them cited “I already knew how the prison society works” as the
reason. Also, twenty percent of offenders reported that life in prison is easier than life on
the outside. If one feels that his experiences are better, or at least no worse, in prison as
compared to his experiences in the community, then the risk of future prison sanctions
will do little to deter future offending.
By documenting the link between prior punishment, inmates’ opportunities
(conceptualized as forms of capital) both in prison and in the community, and likelihood
of re-offending, this research should be used to inform policies that actually reduce the
recidivism rate and can be appropriately called “correctional.”
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When considering the significant relationships between economic, cultural, and
social capital in the community, and likelihood of re-offending, it may prove useful for
policy makers to design criminal punishments that help retain and restore relationships
with significant others, employers, and community members instead of destroying them,
as the current system tends to do. Prior punishment may serve to increase offending
because such ties to the community are destroyed with lengthy prison sentences designed
without rehabilitation, education, and restoration in mind. This research should
encourage policy makers and administrators to rely more heavily on alternative sanctions
that help offenders maintain or increase community capital without the devastating
effects of increasing prison capital.
Because incarceration destroys employment and relationship opportunities, it is
easy for offenders to slip back into their criminal ways (Sampson and Laub 1993; Warr
1998). When offenders’ sentences are up, they are simply placed back into the
community, often with no means to adapt to this new life. It is not surprising that so
many will choose to re-offend and return to prison when they feel that they fare best in
that situation. Many offend because they feel they have nothing to lose by formal
sanctions, such as going to prison. When considering that a culture of criminality may
exist for some offenders, it is unlikely that informal networks of social control will have
any effect on re-offending for these offenders. Until offenders feel that they can best
maximize their potential in the community as compared to a prison society, there is little
hope that we will see a drop in recidivism rates.
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Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this research to examine factors that increase the
likelihood of re-offending for adult incarcerated offenders. After testing two models of
re-offending, a specific deterrence model and a proposed comparable capital model, this
research shows not only that prior punishment experiences increase the likelihood of reoffending, but it also offers an explanation as to why this occurs. Prior punishment
experiences increase prison capital while simultaneously decreasing community capital,
and these divergent levels of capital affect the experiences that one would have in each of
these respective societies. If one’s experience in prison is better, or at least no worse,
than one’s experience in the community, then the risk of future prison sanctions will do
little to deter criminality. Deterrence concepts may have some effect on noncriminal
populations, but punishments designed to be severe in nature may be experienced
differently by offender populations. Further, one cannot assume that the threat of future
prison sanctions will deter all offenders equally.
While this research is not the first to find a positive relationship between previous
punishment experiences and likelihood of re-offending, this novel conceptualization of
re-offending offered by the Capital and Punishment Model accounts for why inmates
vary in their perceived severity of prison sanctions, and, therefore, why inmates are not
equally deterred by the threat of additional prison sentences. Spending time in prison
will lead to divergent levels of capital in prison and in the community. Those with prison
capital may have an improved experience behind prison walls; however, upon release,
they will find that life in the community is difficult. And all too often, they have
diminished economic, cultural, and social capital in the community to improve their
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predicaments. As one’s situation in the community becomes more dreadful, and an
additional prison sentence looks less threatening, re-offending becomes more likely.
Future research should examine the types of offenders that are amenable for
certain types of treatment and those who can be deterred by various forms of punishment,
other than incarceration. Knowing the impact of incarceration experiences on future
offending, prison sentences should be a last resort in our punishment arsenal. The “one
size fits all” mass incarceration mentality has proven ineffective at reducing recidivism
while simultaneously placing an excessive burden on individuals, families, communities,
and correctional budgets.
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